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ABSTRACT
No More Having Your Cake and Eating it Too:
The Nixon Doctrine, South Korea, and the Vietnam War
by Vanessa S. Zenji
The fact that approximately 300,000 South Korean soldiers participated in the Vietnam
War is little known to many Americans. The impact of this on the the U.S.-South Korean
bilateral alliance is even less known. This thesis examines how, during the period from 1969
until the end of the Vietnam War, the Richard Nixon administration and the South Korean Park
Chung-hee administration, balanced their own priorities with those of their bilateral allies. For
President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, the foreign policy priority
centered on improving relations with the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union and China.
The United States thus sought South Korea’s cooperation in helping it extricate itself from the
Vietnam War so it could focus on détente with the USSR and the opening to China. The Park
administration, already disillusioned with the United States since early 1968, found its
participation in the Vietnam War was valued less by the Nixon administration than the Johnson
administration. After the United States reduced its military presence on the Korean peninsula and
failed to closely consult with Park regarding the opening to China, South Korea began to find its
own way, increasingly independent from the United States, and with growing dictatorial powers
for Park. This was possible as South Korea had reaped enormous financial benefits from the
Vietnam War and was able to evolve away from its client status vis-à-vis the United States. A
study of the bilateral relations during this period provides perspective on how we can avoid
alienating allies, while at the same time showing that in any bilateral relationship, each side will
continue to weigh the costs and benefits of continuing the alliance.
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Introduction
On May 12, 1972, a Washington Post article by Laurence Stern and Selig Harrison
argued that “in Nixon Doctrine terms, Korea is eating its cake and having it too. It has both
American troops and a rising level of military assistance dollar aid.”1 By this time, many in the
United States, including lawmakers in Congress, had come to believe that the Republic of Korea
(the ROK or South Korea) was getting too much financial aid and military support from the
United States and that it had reached a level of military preparedness where the number of
American troops stationed in the country, there since the 1953 end of the Korean War, could be
decreased.2 Yet, complicating the picture were the 20,000 South Korean troops (of over 300,000
Korean troops that would serve over the course of the Vietnam War), not in Korea, but in
Vietnam, aiding the South Vietnamese and United States military efforts against North Vietnam
and the National Liberation Front. While initially a sign of alliance solidarity, the ROK’s
participation in Vietnam ultimately would contribute to the souring of U.S.-Korea bilateral
relations in the early 1970s.
When Richard Nixon was inaugurated as President in 1969, he inherited a messy
Vietnam War that was creating strong fractures in American society. At the same time,
Washington policymakers were reassessing the United States’ role as the guarantor of global
stability and a Cold War Pax Americana. In response, President Nixon, in collaboration with his

1

Laurence Stern and Selig Harrison, “U.S., South Korea Fumble for Check on Military Costs,” New York Times,
May 12, 1972, A14.
2
For a sense of the amount of aid South Korea was receiving, according to Westad: “Between 1946 and 1978 South
Korea received almost as much US aid as all of Africa put together.” Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World
History, (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 402.
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National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, articulated a grand strategy that was more pragmatic
than ideological. The United States would aim to forge workable relationships with its two main
rivals, the Soviet Union and China, to form a triangulation, that would allow the Nixon
administration to play the two communist nations off each other while also reducing global
tensions.3 Nixon also hoped that by linking important issues such as arms control to Soviet and
Chinese support for ending the Vietnam War, he could pressure Hanoi to the negotiating table. In
addition, the Nixon Doctrine asked American allies to defend themselves without direct U.S.
military intervention, thereby reducing costly overseas commitments. This was the underpinning
of Nixon’s “Vietnamization” policy, but this triangular diplomacy also had strong implications
for the Republic of Korea. Nixon’s conception of his grand strategy left little room for
consideration of Cold War strategic alliances that were not directly benefiting the United States.
While Pakistan, for example, supported Nixon’s opening to China, and Iran and Saudi Arabia
provided key natural resources, the U.S. government began to see South Korea as more of a
burden than an asset.
With regard to the Vietnam War, the United States failed to consider Korean concerns
related to ending the conflict. Instead, leadership in Washington was losing enthusiasm for the
many U.S. budget expenditures for Korea’s troops in Vietnam, the ROK’s military
modernization programs, and other aid to its Cold War ally. During the administration of
President Lyndon B. Johnson, the ROK’s participation in the Vietnam War was greatly
appreciated for helping the war appear “multilateral.” Yet during the Nixon administration, the
ROK military was viewed as “not pulling its weight” in Vietnam by refusing dangerous
assignments, as being wildly corrupt and inordinately expensive to U.S. taxpayers. Nixon felt

3

For Kissinger’s explanation of “Triangular Politics,” see Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1979), 191-194.
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strong domestic pressure, particularly from Congress, to wean the ROK off of U.S. economic
support, which had grown exponentially during the Vietnam War.
Distrust also grew between the leaders of the United States and South Korea during the
late 1960s and early 1970s. The Nixon White House misrepresented itself to the ROK
government, saying that it would consult the ROK on its Vietnam withdrawal plans and peace
negotiations, which it largely did not. In grand language to President Park Chung-hee, Nixon
promised that “the United States would stand just as firmly with its allies in Asia…. Our
determination to continue honoring those commitments has been made amply clear under the
Nixon Doctrine.”4 However, in reality, the United States was growing further and further apart
from South Korea each time it used its power and weight to impose decisions regarding
withdrawal of U.S. (and even ROK troops) from Vietnam onto South Korea. Nixon and
Kissinger often avoided the advice of the Secretaries of Defense and State and did not heed the
recommendations of the U.S. Ambassador on the ground in Seoul. Perhaps the most
disappointing shock to Seoul was the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) troops
from the ROK in June of 1971 despite strong protest by President Park. This led Park to seek to
pull the remaining ROK troops out of Vietnam, a move that was strongly discouraged by U.S.
leaders. In fact, at the end of the Vietnam War, Korean troops outnumbered U.S. troops.
At the same time, President Nixon sought and achieved an opening with communist
China, an ally of North Korea. While U.S. officials were aware of the angst these meetings
caused President Park, there was little attempt to assuage his concerns and keep him appraised of
discussions. President Park saw the winds of change and, seeing that anti-communism alone
would no longer be a strong glue to keep the U.S.-ROK alliance strong, reached out to the North

4

Letter, President Nixon to President Park, June 16, 1972, Box 757, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence,
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. (Hereafter cited as Nixon Library).
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Korean leadership to propose peace talks, which ultimately failed. Park’s disillusionment with
the United States led him to declare martial law in 1972 and the United States lost leverage
regarding ROK domestic politics for much of the 1970s.
Under the Nixon Doctrine, the ROK, despite its contributions to the Vietnam War, was
downgraded as an ally, not consulted regarding major developments related to ending the
Vietnam War, and blocked in its own efforts to end its participation in the Vietnam War. This
thesis argues that the actions of the U.S. administration show that, as with South Vietnam,
relations with the great Communist powers and management of domestic politics, trumped any
considerations of our “free world” allies. As with South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu,
the ROK was forced to participate in the end of the Vietnam War in a way with which it did not
agree, while also asked to take on more of the burden of fighting its communist neighbor to the
North, the DPRK. The U.S. Congress was ready to cut the large-scale funding to the Republic of
Korea, believing it ready to become more self-sufficient. Therefore, in South Korean eyes, the
benefits of being a United States ally seemed to have been exhausted at the end of the Vietnam
War. This would lead to an estrangement that would last until the death of Park Chung-hee in
1979. And finally, for the United States, consideration of its commitments to “free world” allies
played little to no role in driving U.S. foreign policy, the emphasis instead being on a grand
strategy aiming to position the nation well in the face of the great powers of the Soviet Union
and China.
This exploration into Nixon’s relationship with South Korea during the Vietnam War’s
final years relies heavily on White House and State Department high-level memos. I also have
examined American press reports related to Korea and their participation in the Vietnam War.
Through these documents I will explore how President Nixon and National Security Advisor

4

Kissinger defined their alliance with the Republic of Korea, how they communicated with the
leaders of the ROK, and compare these with the actions they took, specifically in regard to the
Vietnam War.
This study uses interdisciplinary methods to explore the wide impact of the Vietnam War
on South Korea and on U.S.-South Korea relations. In order to understand the economic impact
of the war and how it transformed the Korean economy, I use theories on economic growth and
state formation. International relations and political science literature on alliance and strategies
helped inform my analysis of how two countries weigh the costs and benefits of their
relationship with each other.5 Of particular relevance was Glenn Snyder’s work on the two stages
of an alliance, its formation and its management, and his theories on the costs and benefits of
alliances including the wide range of variables that affect “bargaining” within them.6 To better
understand the motivations that led Korean men to volunteer for war in Vietnam, I looked at the
social and cultural context, referring to concepts of military sociology such as basis of service,
representation and access, and the military as welfare system.7 I explore literature and its use by
Korean veterans in understanding their experiences in Vietnam, especially in looking at
ideology, corruption, and race.
In chapter one, I will examine the background to the ROK’s participation in the Vietnam
War, evaluating motivations of both the Johnson administration as well as the Park regime.
President Johnson sought to maintain the prestige of the United States by succeeding in Vietnam

5

For a definition of alliances, I refer to Kent Calder, Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009), 70. He cites a consensus by international relations scholars that the three central
elements of alliance are “(1) the parties need to be nation states; (2) the purpose of the relationship should be
security enhancement, especially by pooling military strength against a common enemy; and (3) the target of the
alliance should be states outside of the alliance itself.”
6
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
7
For more on military sociology, see David R. Segal and James Burk, Military Sociology (Los Angeles: Sage
Publications, 2011).
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yet needed to make the effort look multilateral, or at least regional. By having the Republic of
Korea fight on the side of South Vietnam, it could be denied that this was a “white man’s war.”
South Korea, while far less than truly democratic, was an ally due to its staunch anti-communism
and willingness to support the United States on various issues. Publicly, South Korean President
Park Chung-hee said he was repaying a debt to the “free world” allies that participated in the
United Nations forces to support South Korea in the Korean War. However, Korea reaped great
financial benefits from its participation in the Korean War.
Next, I will describe the Nixon administration’s grand strategy, the resultant “Nixon
Doctrine,” and its impact on relations with the Republic of Korea. I will begin by examining
what factors caused Nixon and Kissinger to form a grand strategy of “realpolitik” including
changes in the Cold War environment, specifically worsening Soviet-China relations, and the
ongoing Vietnam War. For Korea, the Nixon Doctrine meant the threat of the reduction or
elimination of U.S. troops in the southern half of the peninsula.
How did Nixon’s policy of “Vietnamization” affect the Republic of Korea, its
government, and military including the many thousands of troops in Vietnam? Chapter three will
look at Vietnamization from a South Korean perspective including frustrations over a lack of
consultation regarding peace negotiations and plans for troop withdrawal. In reviewing Nixon
administration documents, it is clear that the White House dismissed the ROK’s serious concerns
about these processes and failed to consult ROK leaders despite their extensive military
commitment in Vietnam.
In chapter four, I will explore how the definition of the ROK as a U.S. ally changed from
1969 to 1973. Economic growth in South Korea, largely attributable to its participation in the
Vietnam War, allowed the Republic of Korea to move away from its patron-client relationship

6

with the United States.8 Unfortunately, the ROK’s growing independence coupled with the U.S.
government’s avoidance of entanglements in domestic Korean political issues, led to a sharp rise
in Park’s authoritarianism, alienating American leaders even further.
Finally, in chapter five, I argue that to understand current U.S.-South Korea relations, it is
necessary to have knowledge of South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War and how it
altered alliance dynamics. Distrust created from the Vietnam experience led to a legacy of
mistrust. The ROK was left to worry if the United States would make foreign policy decisions in
the region, and even on the Korean peninsula, without consulting ROK authorities. Yet, at the
same time, South Korea has continued to send troops and actively support U.S. military missions
from the first Gulf War to Iraq.
Other scholars also have explored the outcomes of President Nixon’s policy in relation to
Korea and its participation in the Vietnam War. Tae Yang Kwak and Benjamin Engel have
reviewed the legacy of the ROK’s Vietnam participation on the U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship,
showing that by 1972, President Park Chung-hee was severely disillusioned with the United
States alliance and engaged in extreme measures to bolster his own political strength. Kwak and
Engel both argue that the end of the Vietnam War was closely tied to Park Chung-hee’s decision
to declare martial law.9 This distrust had gradually increased with the announcement of the

8

Political scientist Robert Kaufman, borrowing from the anthropological concept, describes the “patron-client
relationship” as, “a special type of dyadic exchange, distinguishable by the following characterizes: (a) the
relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status; (b) it is based on the principle of reciprocity; that is,
it is a self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor
expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to the other and which ceases once the expected returns fail to
materialize: and (c) the relationship is particularistic and private, anchored only loosely in public law or community
norms.” Robert R. Kaufman, “The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Prospects and
Problems,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 3 (1974): 285. For an interesting comparison of U.S.
patron-client relationships, including how Ethiopia leveraged its participation in the Korean War to gain support for
its annexation of Eritrea, see Terrence Lyons, “The United States and Ethiopia: The Politics of a Patron-Client
Relationship,” Northeast African Studies 8, no. 2/3 (1986): 53-75.
9
Tae Yang Kwak, “The Nixon Doctrine and the Yusin Reforms: American Foreign Policy, the Vietnam War, and
the Rise of Authoritarianism in Korea, 1968-1973,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 12, no. 1/2
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Nixon doctrine in 1969, the unilateral withdrawal of USFK troops in 1971, and continued refusal
by the United States to include a NATO-style clause in the Mutual Defense Treaty. Kwak argues
that the United States purposefully avoided adding this aforementioned clause as the United
States believed its absence strongly prevented the South from initiating an attack on North
Korea.10
Historian Bruce Cumings, a specialist in modern Korean history, has summarized his
view of the Nixon Doctrine and the ROK as such: “if Richard Nixon was declaring his
independence of America’s Cold War commitments in the region, Park would declare Korean
independence in politics, economics – and national security.”11 None of these works, though, has
placed the end of the Vietnam War and United States- ROK relations in the context of Nixon’s
grand strategy and global outlook which is what I seek to do with this study.
An examination of Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War also reveals several themes
within the larger War and Studies field of study. Korea was deeply changed as a country by its
experiences in Vietnam. Its economic rise changed society and shaped a new national identity for
a South Korea that took its place as an important regional and global actor.12 The experience in
Vietnam also affected the social and governmental institutions in South Korea. With Park
Chung-hee’s turn to authoritarianism in the early 1970s, democracy in South Korea was set back
at least a decade. Looking further back, the effects of the Korean War are also visible, both in
how the United States chose to prepare for and fight the Vietnam War, but also in how the

(2003): 54. Benjamin Engel, “Viewing Seoul from Saigon: Withdrawal from the Vietnam War and the Yushin
Regime,” The Journal of Northeast Asian History 13, no.1 (2016): 79-82.
10
Kwak, “The Nixon Doctrine,” 42.
11
Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005),
364.
12
For more on how South Korea’s economic strength has increased its international role see Uk Heo and Terence
Roehrig, South Korea's Rise: Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, July 2014).
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Korean soldiers viewed their own place in Vietnam and their relationship with the locals and
American soldiers. Finally, there are moral implications, as some claim that the violence learned
by soldiers in Vietnam was then turned by the government on its own citizens. I argue that the
impact of Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War on South Korean society was broad and
varied.

9

1

The Cold War and Asia Before the
Nixon Presidency
In this chapter, I will examine the history of the U.S.- South Korea, the background to

how South Korea became a participant in the Vietnam War, and events leading up to the Nixon
presidency that led to an estrangement between the United States and South Korea. It becomes
clear that the United States placed its goals in Vietnam and the welfare of its military members
ahead of South Korea’s interests, especially Park Chung-hee’s instincts towards revenge against
North Korea after severe provocations. In these episodes, we begin to see the limits of allies’
solidarity and the power of the patron in a patron-client relationship to impose its will on its
client.
The Cold War came to Asia in full force with the success of the Chinese Communists in
their civil war against the Nationalists in 1949.13 With the formation of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), what some call the United States’ “loss” of China,” fears of a domino-like spread
of communism seemed to be coming true. Soon after, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South
Korea, a U.S. ally, ostensibly showing an aggressive and expansionist side of communism.14 For
many, the Korean War served as a lesson book for the war that later came in Vietnam. One of
these lessons was an assumption that if American policymakers did not confront Communist

13

For more information on the beginning of the Cold War in China, see Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Cold War’s
Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace (New York: HarperCollins, 2018), 54-103.
14
For more information on the Korean War, see Chamberlin, Cold War’s Killing Fields, 104-157, and Max
Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).
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expansion, the United States would be weakened globally.15 However, Vietnam was quite a
different war with quite a different ally.16 In Vietnam, the Communists had by far the strongest
nationalist appeal due to their success against the French, while South Vietnamese leaders lacked
popular support, with several powerful local factions competing for power.17
Long before Korean troops reached Vietnamese shores, South Korean President Park
Chung-hee, who took office after a military coup in 1961, had sought to strengthen ties with the
United States by offering to support anti-communist South Vietnamese forces in their fight
against North Vietnam. Sensing a U.S. disengagement from his country and after receiving
notice that some developmental funding was being reduced, President Park, during his first visit
to Washington in November 1961, offered President John F. Kennedy (JFK) the assistance of
South Korean troops to fight communism in Southeast Asia.18 These initial offers were refused
by the United States which itself was not yet sending combat troops to the region. In fact, in
1961, Kennedy was far more concerned with the communist-aligned Pathet Lao insurgency
trying to overthrow the U.S.-backed government in Laos than with the conflict brewing in
Vietnam.19

15

Westad, Cold War, 318. Henry Kissinger also expressed later on that instead of lessons from the Korean War,
Americans should have been paying closer attention to Chinese messaging. After his time serving in government, he
wrote, “Thus it was that, in two separate wars a decade and a half apart, America paid a price for not taking Chinese
statements seriously: in Korea, it had ignored Chinese warnings and marched to the Yalu, triggering Chinese
intervention; in Vietnam, it had failed to understand strong hints by the Chinese that they would not intervene.”
Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement and Extraction from the Vietnam
War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 40.
16
One of the mistaken lessons American leaders would take from the Korean War and apply to the Vietnam War
was to prepare the South Vietnamese military for an invasion of conventional North Vietnamese military troops
across the DMZ, as has happened in Korea. Instead, the real fight would be against guerilla units located at the
village level. See Chamberlin, Cold War’s Killing Fields, 199.
17
Westad, Cold War, 336. See also Frederik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of
America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2014), xix, xxii.
18
Glen Baek, “Park Chung Hee’s Vietnam Odyssey: A Study in Management of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” The
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, no. 2 (2013): 151
19
“JFK in History: Laos,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum,
https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/laos, Accessed May 15, 2020.
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After Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, President Lyndon Baines Johnson
(LBJ) inherited the previous administration’s view that domestic and foreign goals were
complementary and the United States could continue to spend generously on both.20 He also
continued JFK’s policy of “flexible response,” which sought to give the United States the ability
to respond at all levels, “ranging from diplomacy through covert action, guerilla operations,
conventional and nuclear war.” This was a change from the previous President Dwight
Eisenhower’s reliance on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter communist aggression abroad.21
By 1964, President Johnson had decided that the United States would need to send
American troops to Vietnam (to be timed after winning his re-election). According to Odd Arne
Westad, Johnson “principally saw this [Vietnam] in alliance terms: if the word of the United
States did not stand in southeast Asia, what would allies and potential enemies elsewhere
think?”22 With allies on his mind, the administration devised a “Free World Assistance
Program,” commonly known as “More Flags” to recruit allied countries’ support for anticommunist South Vietnam and to make military deployment a multilateral effort. Robert M.
Blackburn argues that showing that the United States had international support for his Vietnam
policy through the use of the More Flags program became a near obsession for Johnson. Because
of this, as the ROK was to see, LBJ was willing to pay just about any price for More Flags
support.23

20

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during
the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 203. See also Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon
Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997), 256, 265.
21
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 213.
22
Westad, Cold War, 323. Historian Frederik Logevall argues that U.S. leaders, particularly Lyndon Johnson, but
also JFK and Robert McNamara, pursued a war in Vietnam, largely to bolster their “personal” credibility. Frederik
Logevall, Choosing War: The Last Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001), 31, 389, 392.
23
Robert M. Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson’s "More Flags": The Hiring of Korean, Filipino, and
Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1994), 133.
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In the summer of 1964, the White House tasked embassies in allied countries to
aggressively seek humanitarian and other assistance for supporting the anticommunist effort in
Vietnam.24 NATO countries demurred, and the overall response rate was underwhelming. The
Republic of Korea, however, saw an opportunity to strengthen bonds with the United States as
well as support the growth of its economy. Park Chung-hee feared the United States was
disengaging from the ROK and sought to strengthen ties and commitments from the United
States in return for sending troops to Vietnam.25 Park worried that a disengagement by the
United States would invite aggressive attacks from North Korea.
The United States was in fact looking to sharply decrease post-Korean War aid. For
example, the United States had begun an interagency review of its U.S. Military Assistance
Program (MAP) to Korea in the summer of 1961.26 The MAP was a Department of Defense
program to support the militaries of U.S. allies. According to Blackburn, “Through this program,
the Department of Defense, using U.S. taxpayer dollars, purchases whatever military supplies
and equipment it perceives an allied military needs to upgrade its armed forces, then it donates
this materiel to that allied nation. It is expected, however, that when the donor nation’s military
reaches a given level of readiness, or their national economy becomes stronger, the financing of
these MAP purchase would incrementally transfer to the allied nation’s national budget.”27 In
1965, the US. Department of Defense was planning a $100 million MAP transfer, meaning that

24

Ibid., 21.
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the ROK would now have to pay that amount for its military goods out of its own budget instead
of having the United States cover it.28
Both sides benefited handsomely from their collaboration in Vietnam. The funds entering
South Korea allowed President Park to carry out his economic modernization goals. The United
States was able to use the Korean soldiers in the place of American soldiers serving in Vietnam
for much lower pay and at significantly decreased domestic political cost. At the same time, the
Korean troops supported Johnson’s goal of projecting the image of an international and
multiracial anti-communist coalition in Vietnam.
However, attaining the agreement of the South Vietnamese for receiving ROK and other
third country military support was a sensitive process. When U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of
Vietnam (South Vietnam) Maxwell Taylor was tasked with telling the South Vietnamese to
request ROK troops, the Ambassador cabled Washington back saying, “Before I can present our
case to GVN [Government of Vietnam], I have to know what that case is and why. It is not going
to be easy to get ready concurrence for the large scale introduction of foreign troops unless the
need is clear and explicit.” The ambassador anticipated a “sharp debate” with the South
Vietnamese government.29
In late April 1965, Taylor presented the case for additional U.S. and new third country
combatants to Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat, to which Quat gave
an indirect, confusing answer, ultimately accepting what he knew to be the United States’ wishes
in order to present a more “international” force. According to Taylor’s cable, Quat “concluded
that since it was the position of his Government that the cause of South Vietnam is really the
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cause of the Free World, it would be entirely consistent for him to accept third country units. He
noted in passing that he was aware of our US domestic problem and that the presence of other
flags would be of assistance to us.”30 Later in a cable on April 28, the Embassy reported that
“Quat gave his complete concurrence with the introduction of the U.S. and third country
forces.”31 While on the face of it, Quat may have agreed, reading between the lines, it seems he
concurred mostly because he knew it was what the United States wanted.
During this time, the United States prioritized its own need for the illusion of a grand
“international” mission in Vietnam. Negotiations of the exact forms of aid, humanitarian
assistance and military troops was done directly between Washington and Seoul, with Saigon
only informed afterwards and told what they should “request” from the Koreans.32
While the economic benefits to South Korea were enormous, most scholars argue that the
main reasons for sending troops to Vietnam were political.33 Seeing Johnson’s desperation for
Free World allies, Park knew he could make himself an indispensable ally to the United States,
which would disincline the United States from nurturing his opposition.34 Some argue that the
Vietnam War helped bolster Park’s anti-communist credentials to his domestic public in light of
his flirtation with communism in the 1940s.35 In fact, the country under Park was strongly anticommunist in education and other propaganda. In the summer of 1961, Park passed an
anticommunist law, to supplement the earlier National Security Law, defining all socialist
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countries as enemy states.36 I believe that more than to bolster his anti-communist credentials,
Park sought to win favor with the United States.
On the security side, thanks in large part to the Vietnam War, Park was able to modernize
the ROK forces, receiving top-level military equipment. Participation in Vietnam could also be
seen as a way of having troops be “combat-ready” for any potential crises with North Korea.
Park also hoped the United States would feel a debt of obligation to continue to maintain troops
in South Korea and provide protection should North Korea seriously attack the South again.
Economically, the benefits are clear by looking at the famous 1966 “Brown Letter”
(diplomatic cable) from Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown to Washington listing the U.S.
concessions to South Korea for sending troops. From the cable, one can see that the United
States financial assistance went well beyond military aid to cover most segments of the Korean
economy. Benefits listed in the Brown Letter included the financing and equipping of all new
costs of ROK forces deploying to Vietnam, a 30 percent higher overseas allowance for ROK
forces, equipment for ROK military modernization, procurement of South Korean goods and
equipment for the Korean troops in Vietnam, additional opportunities for South Korean
contractors to be awarded construction projects in Vietnam, significant developmental loans, and
a pledge to suspend the MAP transfer program.37
According to some historians, all told South Korea received about one billion U.S.
dollars’ worth of benefits related to its troop deployment in Vietnam.38 In the words of novelist
and Vietnam veteran Ahn Junghyo, “the blood money we had to earn at the price of our lives
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fueled the modernization of the country. And owing to our contribution, the Republic of Korea,
or at least a higher echelon of it, made a gigantic stride into the world market.”39 Additionally,
Korean soldiers in Vietnam were required to send 85% of their earnings to Korea automatically
providing huge remittances.40
East Asian scholar Frank Baldwin argues that the “American and South Korean
governments constantly concealed, censored, and lied about the U.S. utilization of ROK forces in
Vietnam.”41 The U.S. payments to the ROK were concealed from the public and at times funded
indirectly through programs such as the PL-480 and MAP. The PL-480 or Food for Peace
program had begun in 1954 under President Eisenhower. It allowed the president to authorize the
shipment of excess U.S. foodstuffs to “friendly” nations for free or through grants.42 The United
States benefited because with the export of excess commodities, domestic prices remained high
for American farmers.
Vietnam also allowed the Republic of Korea to bolster its image as a regional and global
actor. In January 1965, President Park announced, “We are emerging from the past history of
relying on outside help to stand at the crossroads of opening a glorious new chapter in the
nation’s history.”43 Economically, Vietnam was used as a test market for South Korean products
such as steel, transportation equipment, and nonelectric machinery.44 Thus, one could argue
President Park was using the Vietnam War to enhance the reach of South Korea’s economic and
political influence throughout the region, if not the world.
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Historians have described Park Chung-hee’s Korea as a “developmental dictatorship”
where political freedoms were curtailed alongside high levels of government management of
industrialization which were justified to spur rapid economic growth.45 Park had solid support
from the ROK Army which also was the strongest and best organized unit within the South
Korean government, due to the legacy of the Korea War, American aid and training, and Cold
War realities.46 With the Army’s support, he managed to maintain strong control on South
Korea’s society and economy. The contradictions of this “developmental dictatorship” are the
reason why President Park has such a complex legacy in Korea. On the one hand, he created a
South Korea that is now a member of the OECD and an important global player, and whose cars,
televisions and cell phones are sold around the world. On the other hand, using the support of his
army, Park brutally suppressed any dissent and kept opposition politicians from gaining any
power.
Park also had global aspirations for Korea and hoped participation in the Vietnam War
would help him fulfill some of these goals. In his view, the deployment of South Korean troops
to Vietnam, “demonstrated the bravery of Korean manhood to the world” and showed that Korea
was now a “sovereign, adult nation.”47 Publicly, Park called Vietnam the “second front line” of
the Korean War. In October 1965, he said “unless we deter the communist aggression in free
South Vietnam, the whole of South East Asia will be lost in the near future, and the security of

45

Lee Byong-cheon, “The Political Economy of Developmental Dictatorship,” in Developmental Dictatorship and
the Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea, ed. Lee Byeong-cheon (Paramus:
Homa and Sekey Books, 2003), 5.
46
Ibid., 22.
47
Jin-kyung Lee, Service Economies: Militarism, Sex Work, and Migrant Labor in South Korea (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 42.

18

the Republic of Korea could not be assured.” Whether this was for public consumption or he
truly believed it, Park seems to have subscribed to the “domino theory.”48
For all these reasons, Park complied with Johnson’s requests and the first Korean
contingent of a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) unit and a group of Tae Kwon Do
instructors arrived in Vietnam in September 1964. The Republic of Korea did cover costs for this
first group. The “Dove Unit” arrived in Vietnam in March 1965, a construction group and a
Marine Corp engineer company tasked with building bridges, clinics and other buildings.49 The
public was led to believe the costs for the Dove Unit were covered by Seoul, however Blackburn
argues that money was funneled to Korea through the PL-480 and MAP programs.50
While South Vietnam wished to have operational control, South Korea refused to be
under any country except the United States. In a compromise, it was decided that the Free World
Military Assistance Policy Council would determine the operational functions of ROK forces.51
In the end, a verbal understanding was agreed upon, wherein command would be retained by the
Korean general and General Westmoreland head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV). would have operational control over ROK forces.52 This lack of a written
agreement on operational control was to help the ROK save “face,” as Westmoreland told
Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander of the United States Pacific Command.53
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Washington knew that Seoul was eager to do still more and receive the related benefits.
In December of 1964, President Johnson received a memo from his White House staff notifying
him that “the Koreans have not only been willing to send military help to Viet-Nam, but are even
anxious to do so, providing we pay the bill.”54 In April 1965, President Johnson sent a personal
request to President Park for a regimental combat team (approximately 4000 men).55 Park,
though eager to send troops, drove a hard bargain in order to extract the maximum concession,
securing a 75% pay raise for ROK civilian and military services and a suspension of the MAP
transfer program so that the United States would continue to provide military aid and these costs
would not be transferred to the ROK budget.56
In September 1965, two military working agreements were signed, one between the
South Vietnamese and ROK forces, and one between ROK forces and General Westmoreland.
The agreements stipulated that MACV and the South Vietnamese military would provide
logistical support for the ROK troops and that the ROK equipment would be procured through
the American MAP program.57
The first combat units from South Korea arrived between September and November
1965. These were the Tiger Division and the Blue Dragon (2nd Marine Brigade), totaling 18,212
men.58 On their departure from Korea, a patriotic group of 300,000 South Koreans came to bid
farewell in a ceremony for the Tiger Unit singing the unit’s signature song, “Let’s defend our
fatherland.”59 Park used elaborate ceremonies for the troops’ departure and return to boost public
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patriotism, broadcasting the events on radio and television.60 The Vietnam-bound soldiers were
glorified by Park as the “descendants of Hwarang,” elite warriors of the Shilla Dynasty (57 BC –
935 AD in the southern and central Korean peninsula) around which a militaristic cult had grown
in the early twentieth century.61 South Koreans were once again coming together to fight the
“evils” of communism.
UPI reported on a later combat team attached to the Tiger Division, landing in Qui Nhon
in April 1966, that came ashore singing “Arirang,” the unofficial song of Korea greeted by
young Vietnamese ladies welcoming them with flower leis.62 Later in the spring of 1966, as a
result of the “Brown Memorandum,” the ROK sent the elite 9th Infantry White Horse Division,
for a total of approximately 45,000 Korean soldiers on the ground in Vietnam.
This was to be the last military contingent sent to South Korea.63 While there were
discussions of sending additional ROK troops, these plans were cancelled due to Park’s
reelection campaign and growing public concern about the ROK’s own safety, especially after
the DPRK’s attempted assassination of Park in 1968.64 By 1967, the Koreans would be part of
free world forces in a highly militarized South Vietnam, along with the South Vietnamese,
Americans, and much smaller deployments of Australian, Thai and Filipino soldiers that
according to historian Frances FitzGerald, “reached a combined total of 1,300,000 men: one
soldier for very fifteen people in South Vietnam.”65
The Korean troops were mostly deployed in the coastal regions of Vietnam. The ROK
Forces in Vietnam had a headquarters in Saigon and a field office in Nha Trang which controlled
60
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operations in the provinces of Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Ninh Thuan.
Their tactical area of responsibility spanned 6,812 square kilometers.66 While U.S. troops had
more support helicopters, and therefore were able to move more rapidly to various areas, ROK
troops had more or less a “set” area to defend. One of the key missions ROK troops were
involved in was keeping highways open.67 According to a 1969 publication, “the Korean Capital
Division, the 9th Infantry Division and the 2d Marine Brigade carried out orders to protect the
Vietnamese population on both sides of Highway 1. Since the ROK troops did not have
helicopters and were not highly mobile, they performed clearing and holding operations instead
of large-scale offensive sweeps. As Lieutenant General Chae Myung Shin, commander of
Korean forces in Vietnam, explained, “We hit and stay, not search and destroy.”68
Of the South Korean troops serving in Vietnam, over 60 percent were volunteers.69 It is
hard to know exactly why individual Korean men volunteered to serve in Vietnam. Eun Seo Jo
argues that they did so in order to “provide financial support for their impoverished families” and
due to a “cult of militarized valor.”70 Through oral interviews with ROK Vietnam War veterans,
Jo found that many of them struggled to obtain three meals a day and faced a real threat of
starvation, prior to joining the military.71

66

“Asian Allies in Viet-Nam”. Vietnam Bulletin, A Weekly Publication of the Embassy of Vietnam in Washington
D.C., March 1970. Texas Tech University, The Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Douglas Pike
Collection. (Hereafter cited as Pike Collection)
67
Larson and Collins, Allied Participation in Vietnam, 143.
68
“Aussies, ROKs, and other Allies” The Vietnam Experience, Time Life Inc., 1970, Pike Collection.
69
Eun Seo Jo, "Fighting for Peanuts: Reimagining South Korean Soldiers' Participation in the Wǒllam Boom," The
Journal of American-East Asian Relations 21, no. 1 (2014): 63.
70
Ibid., 58. According to Frank Baldwin, “the U.S. overseas allowance for an ROKA Private was more than twentythree times his normal base pay.” Baldwin, “Rented Troops,” 38.
71
Jo, “Fighting for Peanuts,” 69-70.

22

According to Han Kwan Duk, a future ROK military attaché to the embassy in
Washington, speaking in his official capacity in 1993, there were three reasons Korean troops
went to Vietnam:
“First, national sympathy for Vietnamese whose life was threatened by the
communists. Second, we viewed the war in Vietnam as the Soviet scheme to
communize the whole world under their umbrella, and thought if Vietnam fell in
the hands of the communists, other countries in Asia would follow the [sic] suit.
Finally, Korea went to Vietnam to help another country when the country was
threatened. The United States and fifteen other countries had come to help Korea
when its freedom was threatened.”72
In reality, soldiers likely joined for both patriotic and economic reasons. Many did
remember as youths the foreign, mostly American, soldiers that came to defend South Korea.
Yet, given the level of poverty in South Korea at the time, what led so many South Koreans to
take action and volunteer to go to Vietnam was primarily the promise of economic gain and the
ability to improve one’s standing in society.
While the United States may have sought to send Asian troops to Vietnam to prove this
was not a “white man’s war,” South Vietnam’s pride was bruised by the specter of other Asians
coming to rescue them.73 Yet in the end, the United States wish to show a strong coalition in the
war won out. How did the Korean soldiers themselves view race issues during the Vietnam War?
According to Jinim Park, Koreans vacillated between two conflicting views of themselves: one
as American allies, and one as the same Asian “gooks” as the Vietnamese.74 In the novel The
Shadow of Arms, when an American soldier tells a Korean soldier about a club that has a “no
gooks” policy, the Korean asks, “who are gooks?” The American answers, “Vietnamese. They
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are really filthy. But you are like us. We’re the Allies.”75 Yet no doubt many Koreans
remembered that in the war in their own country less than 20 years earlier, they were the “gooks”
to American GIs.
Nearing the end of LBJ’s presidency, as the ROK government was mulling over an
additional request from the United States to send an additional troop division, a series of attacks
both in South Vietnam and on the Korean peninsula in January 1968 were to be a key turning
point both for the Vietnam War and U.S.-ROK relations. In January 1968, the United States,
Korea, and South Vietnam suffered severe blows: the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the capture by
North Korea of the U.S. Navy ship Pueblo with over 30 U.S. sailors on board, and a North Korea
commando attack on the presidential palace, the Blue House, in an attempted assassination of
Park. These events would cancel any plans by Park of sending additional troops to Vietnam.
During the Blue House raid, North Korean commandos reached within 100 meters of the
Blue House, killing 26 Koreans and four Americans in the process. Park was greatly frustrated
when the United States disallowed him from responding to the North Korean infiltration and
assassination attempt. According to researcher Benjamin Engel, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defense Cyrus Vance told Park in February 1968 that if Park retaliated for the attack on the Blue
House, the United States would pull all USFK troops out of the country.76 (If Park had been
privy to U.S. government cables at the time where Secretary of State Dean Rusk called Koreans
the “Irish of the East” and “super sensitive,” he may have been even more upset.)77 To add insult
to injury, Park also was kept out of the loop regarding secret negotiations between the United
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States and North Korea on the return of the U.S. sailors captured on the USS Pueblo. These
series of events left President Park frustrated and disillusioned with the United States. Thus, as
Nixon came into office in 1969, the U.S.-ROK relationship was already seriously strained.

25

2

The Nixon Doctrine, the Great Powers
and the ROK
Richard Nixon, a previous congressman and vice president under Eisenhower, was

elected president in November 1968, defeating democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey after
Johnson decided not to run for re-election, largely due to the challenges of Vietnam. While
Johnson was an expert in domestic politics and a master of the U.S. Congress, Nixon throughout
his career had focused more on international dynamics. In this chapter, I will show how Nixon’s
view of global power and politics, particularly his goal to strengthen communication and
relations with the Soviet Union and China, led him to increasingly disregard what he saw as less
important allies, including South Korea. Nixon, when weighing the costs and benefits of the
U.S.-ROK alliance, increasingly saw more costs and less benefits, including less value in South
Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War. Instead of moving his South Korean counterpart along
with his movements towards the Soviet Union and China, Park Chung-hee was excluded and left
increasingly nervous and anxious about South Korea’s place in the world and the level to which
it could rely on the United States.
After becoming president, Nixon would work closely with his National Security Advisor,
former Harvard professor Henry Kissinger, to form their own international policies, largely
dismissing outside opinions from those such as the State Department or Department of Defense.
As historian Daniel Sargent described, Nixon “put the office of the national security adviser at
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the heart of the foreign-policy apparatus.”78 Nixon and Kissinger accepted that there were limits
to U.S. power and they understood and welcomed a change from a world that was bipolar to a
multipolar world as a way to keep “balance” in international politics. 79
Many historians look to Nixon’s October 1967 article in the journal Foreign Affairs that
called for a U.S. policy that looked “beyond Vietnam” as a preview of what would become his
Nixon Doctrine. In the article, he suggested that “if another friendly country should be faced
with an externally supported communist insurrection—whether in Asia, or in Africa or even
Latin America—there is serious question whether the American public or the American
Congress would now support a unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host
government. This makes it vitally in their own interest that the nations in the path of China’s
ambitions move quickly to establish an indigenous Asian framework for their own future
security.”80 Not only was Nixon trying to extricate the United States from its disproportionate
burden in Vietnam, but also he was much less interested in “nation building” that had been a
hallmark of the Kennedy presidency. 81
Instead, Nixon’s focus as President would be on the “great” powers, often to the
detriment of smaller powers, including U.S. allies. 82 In Foreign Affairs he argued that “any
discussion of Asia’s future must ultimately focus on the respective roles of four giants: India, the
world’s most populous non-communist nation; Japan, Asia’s principal industrial and economic
power; China, the world’s most populous nation and Asia’s most immediate threat; and the
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United States, the greatest Pacific power.”83 In order to engage with the “great power” of
Communist China, Nixon and Kissinger would move away from a strictly ideological view of
threats and cooperation.84
What would become the “Nixon Doctrine,” originally labeled the “Guam Doctrine,” was
announced during a presidential stop in Guam on July 25, 1969. In a background briefing with
reporters, Nixon said that in discussions with the Australian Prime Minister, he had been asked if
the United States, after its tough experiences in Korea and Vietnam, would exit Asia as the
British, French, and other colonial powers had done.85 Nixon replied that leaders in Asia were
telling him that they wanted (to borrow a term from the Japanese imperial era) “Asia for Asians”
and that he agreed. Answering a journalist’s question on the future U.S. military role in Asia,
Nixon responded, “One, we will keep our treaty commitments…but two, that as far as the
problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for
the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to
encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will increasingly be handled by, and the
responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”86 Notably, President Nixon also
added that he foresaw U.S. military aid to Asian allies receding.87
To summarize, the Nixon Doctrine indicated how the United States would maintain its
treaty commitments and be willing to use nuclear weapons if needed to defend allies, presumably
from a nuclear attack by the USSR. Moreover, the United States would provide military and
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economic assistance to its allies, but, learning the hard lesson of Vietnam, not manpower.88 Also
key to this re-alignment of priorities was a review of the United States’ military posture in Asia.
The Nixon Administration sought to reduce U.S. troops in Asia, though not in Europe, with
Nixon considering a cut of 14.5 divisions in Asia for a potential savings of $5 billion a year.89
According to Sargent, there were also important economic reasons for this as the deficits in the
U.S. balance of payments were made significantly worse by U.S. overseas military
commitments.
In order to reduce tensions that could potentially lead to conflict in Asia and elsewhere,
Nixon and Kissinger sought to exploit tensions in relations between the USSR and China, the
Sino-Soviet split. During the same press briefing where Nixon announced the Nixon Doctrine, he
had told reporters that he thought a summit with the USSR could only be useful if it discussed
one of three topics: the Mideast, arms control, and Vietnam.90 To gain additional benefits, Nixon
and Kissinger promoted using “linkage” as a part of the détente with the USSR, tying progress
on issues of importance to USSR to progress on issues of interest to the United States, such as
ending the Vietnam War.91
Nixon also believed it would be beneficial to bring the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), an ideological and diplomatic nightmare for both the United States and the USSR since
its Cultural Revolution began in 1966, into the community of nations. In his 1967 Foreign
Affairs essay, Nixon had written that “taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave
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China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and
threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most
able people to live in angry isolation. But we could go disastrously wrong if, in pursuing this
long-range goal, we failed in the short range to read the lessons of history. The world cannot be
safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to
induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy
its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign
adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems.”92 By 1969,
Nixon added that he saw a much smaller threat of China exporting communism to its neighbors,
for various reasons but largely due to the strong economic growth in non-communist nations
such as Taiwan and Japan.93
Significantly before Nixon’s famous trip to China, in a December 1970 meeting between
Kissinger and future ROK Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, Kissinger admitted that world politics
was in a “transitional period.” On China, according to notes of the meeting, Kissinger said, “we
had no illusions about China, which we knew was our enemy. However, we had two enemies,
the USSR and China, which happened to be fighting one another. Speaking quite frankly, we
therefore were trying to see if we could use one enemy against the other. While we realized
China was not our friend, the tactical situation required us to see how we might use China in
moves vis-à-vis the Soviets. In this, though, it was out of the question that we would sacrifice
Korea to China.”94 Here Kissinger clearly admits to a plan to play the two communist
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superpowers against each other as he tries to reassure the Koreans that they will continue to
receive support from the United States.
Sources show that President Park felt he was not consulted sufficiently regarding the
United States’ opening to China. In a February 1972 NSC memo, NSC staffer John Holdridge
wrote, “Park’s nervousness over the Peking trip is well known to you…Apparently to try force
our hand on a summit meeting, Park has invoked his prime leverage – a threat to pull his two
divisions out of Vietnam after next May.” Holdridge concluded “I believe it is highly important
for you to try to see Kim [ROK ambassador to the United States] at least briefly before we leave
for Peking next Thursday.”95
While Park multiple times requested a meeting with Nixon before his trip to China and
was refused, the Chinese kept the DPRK (with whom they had had a falling out during the
Cultural Revolution but now had renewed their relationship) closely in the loop. When Zhou
Enlai met with Henry Kissinger, he delivered a list of eight points from Kim Il-sung to the
American and he traveled to DPRK soon after to debrief Kim Il-sung.96 During the period Kim
Il-sung traveled to Beijing for consultations once and Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang twice, while
Park Chung-hee found out about the Kissinger visit to the PRC after it happened. Eventually,
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Park also watched as the U.S.’s anti-communist ally Taiwan was sacrificed and replaced in the
United Nations Security Council by the PRC.97
The other East Asian “giant” that Nixon had identified in his Foreign Affairs article was
Japan, the growing economic and industrial powerhouse of Asia. Nixon envisioned a future
world in which Japan would “play an increasing role” in the region and the world.98 According
to John Lewis Gaddis, Kissinger became an advocate of “trilateralism” by which Japan would be
considered “a major center of world power in its own right, and had to be given attention in the
future comparable to that accorded Western Europe.”99 Japan also played an important security
role in the Pacific hosting a large number of U.S. military bases.
Both Japan and South Korea were anti-communist allies of the United States but as
George Kennan said in 1964, “[South Korea] is important, but Japan is more important still.”100
(Park, though, by participating in LBJ’s More Flags program for Vietnam, was able to gain
leverage and increase his importance to the United States under LBJ.) For security and economic
reasons, the United States had strongly encouraged President Park of Korea to normalize
diplomatic relations with Japan, its former colonial ruler. In 1965, Park pragmatically chose to
normalize relations with Japan largely in order to help his country’s economic development.101
Unfortunately, many of the legacies of colonialism were not fully dealt with.102 The diplomatic
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agreement would significantly help the ROK’s economy through increased trade. However, there
would be tension due to Japan’s large economic benefits from the Vietnam War, larger than the
ROK’s, despite the ROK sending its troops and Japan not doing so.103
Of all the countries, however, the USSR, due its influence and military power, became
the central focus of Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomacy.104 The Nixon administration continued
and emphasized a policy of “détente” (an easing of tensions and increased cooperation on issues
of common interest) with the USSR.105 The White House encouraged to press forward with
détente, and ignore an ideological contest against the USSR, due to the opportunities arising
from a Sino-Soviet split between the world’s two largest communist powers, culminating in a
border conflict along the Ussuri River in 1969.106
One of the signature aspects of détente under Nixon was the concept of “linkage,”
meaning that the United States would tie progress of issues of importance to the USSR to the
priorities of the Nixon administration.107 The Nixon administration in particular sought to push
the USSR to press North Vietnam for a cease-fire and working towards ending the Vietnam War
with the USSR priority of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) negotiations.108 Nixon and
Kissinger also believed that through engagement with the USSR, they could contribute to
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minimizing global tensions and the potential for a “hot” war. The USSR was also a key patron of
North Korea, and détente was to have implications for the ROK-DPRK relationship.109
With a thawing of the United States’ relationship with the USSR and China, both Koreas
re-calibrated the benefits of dialogue as they saw their respective patrons coming together, and
potentially moving further away from them. On August 20, 1971, delegates from both Koreas
convened at Red Cross Talks in Panmunjom, the meeting room located directly on the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Eventually, however, this dialogue would bear no results nor any
warming of relations between the two Koreas.110
During the early to mid 1960s, the DPRK had sought to strengthen itself against real and
perceived threats. These included the increasing rift between its two patrons, the Soviet Union
and China, the Cuban Missile crisis (perhaps seeing parallels between Cuba’s situation and its
own), the military coup of Park Chung-hee in 1961, and the normalization of South Korean and
Japanese diplomatic relations in 1965. According to Han Hong-koo, the DPRK saw the
normalization of ROK-Japan relations in 1965 “as consolidation of a tripartite military alliance
among the United States Japan, and South Korea and as the signal for a resurrection of Japanese
militarism.”111 In response, the DPRK began to increasingly build up its military power with an
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increased defense budget. As a result, the number of DPRK provocations rose sharply during the
early years of Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War. While in 1965, there were 99
provocations, these numbers reached 784 in 1967 and 985 in 1968.112 The most serious of these
provocations against the ROK was the aforementioned Blue House infiltration and assassination
attempt on Park in January 1968.
During Nixon’s presidency, he also had to decide how to respond to DPRK provocations
with the DPRK’s shooting down of a U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the Sea of
Japan (“East Sea” in Korea) in April 1969.113 While direct military actions were discussed, in the
end, Nixon instead merely announced that reconnaissance flights in the area would continue. To
prove his resolve to the Communist world, both North Korea and Vietnam, Nixon stepped up
bombing of North Vietnam with Operation Lunch, the second phase of the Menu bombings of
Cambodia.114
Due to the messy process of deciding how to respond, Nixon and Kissinger reflected that
other advisors had caused them to waiver and abstain from a quick, strong response.115 Kissinger
used the opportunity to strengthen and consolidate power in the NSC and created a Washington
Special Agency Group (WSAG), an interagency working group where he would be the senior
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member. Afterwards Nixon was to make key foreign policy decisions alone or only in
consultation with Kissinger.116
As a result of the Nixon Doctrine, therefore, we see that for the United States, the alliance
with the Republic of Korea was given less precedence than improving relations with the other
great superpowers, notably the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. By not closely
consulting with President Park regarding the opening to China, Nixon created a strong sense of
insecurity for Park and his government. While the Republic of Korea had become a more
valuable ally to President Johnson due to its participation in the Vietnam War, this meant much
less to the Nixon Administration. Nixon’s sights were already set on a post-Vietnam War world
where he believed improved relations with the USSR and PRC would lead to decreased tensions
(especially nuclear), and a safer, more stable world.
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3

The United States, South Korea, and
the End of the Vietnam War

During his 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon already had announced his plans for
“peace with honor” and an end to the war in Vietnam. His strategy ended up focusing on
demonstrations of military strength in unpredictable doses, the so-called “Madman Theory,”
peace negotiations, and “Vietnamization.” Vietnamization was the process by which the South
Vietnamese military would take over the American combat role in Vietnam with additional
training, while at the same time U.S. and allied country troops slowly withdrew. In this chapter I
will show how the processes of Vietnamization and peace negotiations increased the
estrangement between the U.S. and South Korean governments. South Korea’s concerns were
largely ignored, with leaders at the high levels of U.S. government failing to take Park Chunghee’s position into account. This period also saw the United States preventing South Korea from
carrying out its own withdrawal from Vietnam.
Gregory Daddis and David Anderson both argue that Vietnamization was a political
strategy decided by the Nixon White House that failed to thoughtfully consider the military and
political consequences for the South Vietnamese government.117 According to Anderson, Nixon
“despised” South Vietnamese leaders and “exhibited no sense of obligation” towards them.118
Instead, Nixon and Kissinger had their eyes on larger prizes. In Nixon’s War, Jeffrey Kimball
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writes that “to Nixon, a satisfactory ending to the war in Vietnam was a prerequisite to his and
others’ goal of a postwar American-led economic, political and military association of ‘free’
Pacific Rim states, with South Vietnam at the apex of an arc curving from New Zealand to
Japan.”119 Again, it seems that U.S. political grand strategy trumped commitments to U.S. allies
such as South Vietnam and South Korea.
In April 1969, Kissinger, on behalf of the White House, tasked the State Department,
Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to come up with a plan for
“Vietnamizing” the war.120 The guidance stated that the United States and third country “free
world” allies should move toward support roles only.121 Once completed, Kissinger passed
Secretary of Defense’s Laird’s official response (coordinated with the State Department and
CIA) to President Nixon on June 23, noting the possible drawbacks of withdrawing too quickly.
“The longer-term plans on Vietnamization provide a series of alternatives for U.S. troop
reductions with varying timetables from 18 months to 42 months, and varying ceilings for
the residual American troops in South Vietnam ranging from 260,000 to 306,000.
Secretary Laird feels that even a 42 month timetable with withdrawals up to 290,000
forces would probably result in interruption of pacification progress. A much faster
withdrawal could result in more serious problems for pacification and allied military
capabilities, as well as possible adverse effects on the GVN, in the absence of reciprocal
North Vietnamese withdrawals.”122
Clearly there were military concerns of how Vietnamization and troop withdrawals might have
negative results for the government of South Vietnam.
Laird understood the political need to withdraw American troops from Vietnam, as his
report to the president intimated. “As more of the combat role is assumed by the Vietnamese, the
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United States and troop contributing countries gradually will reorient their role to encompass
reserve, support, and advisory functions only. This will lead to a phased reduction of US and
troop contributing countries forces.”123 Their prediction of how South Korea would react to
Vietnamization was that the ROK might offer additional troops due to its interest in “political,
economic, and military cooperation” in Southeast Asia and for a chance to position itself well to
be a key player in reconstruction efforts after the end of the war.124 Leadership in Washington
still believed that for Korea the benefits of staying in Vietnam outweighed the drawbacks.
There were many reasons to believe that South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu
would have serious concerns regarding Vietnamization. Laird visited Thieu in March 1969 and
started to prepare the Saigon regime for Vietnamization. However, Thieu was taken aback and
felt the conditions had changed dramatically from what he had been “promised” by LBJ. Laird
then reportedly gave Thieu a lecture on U.S. politics in what David Anderson says, “conveys a
dark tone of neocolonial patronizing in Laird’s approach to an ally whose interests the United
States claimed to be defending.”125 Unfortunately, the United States appears to have treated its
ally in a condescending and dismissive way in regards to a decision that would decide the lives
and fates of the Thieu, his government and the population of South Vietnam.
The Nixon administration went on with Vietnamization plans despite Thieu’s protests. In
fact, Thieu was even enlisted to help make its public announcement. Nixon met with President
Thieu on Midway Island in June 1969 where they jointly described the strategy for what would
become known as Vietnamization. Nixon put words in Thieu’s mouth, making it sound like the
“troop replacements” were his idea. “President Thieu informed me that the progress of the
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training program and the equipping program for South Vietnamese forces had been so successful
that he could now recommend that the United States begin to replace U.S. combat forces with
Vietnamese forces.” Conveniently, Nixon announced, this also matched the recommendations of
the U.S. military.126 Together, they told of an upcoming withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops.127
With the issue of U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, we see that the United States
failed to consult even the government of South Vietnam, the ones with the most at stake, much
less the ROK. In 1969, according to Ambassador Bui Diem, troop withdrawal plans “had never
been officially submitted to the South Vietnamese for their approval or for some
counterproposal.”128 Despite these public proclamations of solidarity and unity, historians
believe that Thieu was presented with a fait accompli during the meeting at Midway.129
Even before the announcement of Vietnamization, the Republic of Korea was concerned
about behind left behind as residual troops while the U.S. troops departed. In a conversation with
President Nixon in April 1969, ROK Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon reportedly said that “it
would be political disaster for the Korean government if the U.S. withdraws its forces and Korea
does not do likewise. He stressed the need for close consultation on the question. The President
said that we would of course consult closely with Korea on this and other problems of mutual
interest.”130 Unfortunately, this would not turn out to be the case.
With the president adopting such new policies in Asia, Nixon needed to explain his views
on Vietnamization plans, the Nixon Doctrine, and North Korean threats to his South Korean
allies. In late August 1969, President Nixon met with President Park in San Francisco to “explain
126
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a few items on my new policy toward Korea.”131 The President described key issues that worried
Park, trying to reassure him. On North Korea, President Nixon said that “if North Korea
provokes another provocative incident, we will react, are prepared to react and will take
measures harsher than the enemy provocation.”132 On the Nixon Doctrine, he reassured Park that
“the U.S. will fulfill its treaty obligations with the Asian countries concerned. We will honor the
U.S.-ROK Defense Treaty.” Notably, here he does make any promises about maintaining certain
levels of U.S. troops on the peninsula. Finally, President Nixon explained Vietnamization. At the
time, Park assured Nixon that the ROK would stay in Vietnam as long as needed. President Park
said, “It is my thinking that unless we are requested by South Vietnam or the U.S. we will
continue to station our troops in Vietnam.”133 Nixon concluded by reassuring Park, “We are
partners in our common struggle…I will inform you of all the measures we plan to take on
Vietnam as they occur.”134 As history would have it, neither would fully keep their promises.
As early as 1970, some of the issues of a fast-paced U.S. military withdrawal already
were beginning to show as U.S. military leaders found the South Vietnam military wrestling with
long-term problems including a lack of competent leadership.135 Anderson finds that key
challenges of Vietnamization were training and equipping the South Vietnamese to fully take
over engineering requirements and helicopter and signal management.136 Between 1970 and
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1971, the RVNAF took over helicopter responsibilities from the United States.137 Helicopter
support would become a key issue for remaining ROK troops in Vietnam.
By 1971, the ROK was seriously considering a withdrawal from Vietnam. To compare,
the Filipino troops were the first “free world” allies to leave Vietnam with the majority of troops
gone by early 1970. Next would be New Zealand who withdraw from Vietnam in March 1971.
The Thai military would complete its redeployment in February 1972 followed by most of the
Australian troops (not including an Army Training Team) who departed in March 1972.138 These
countries would leave minimal troops in country in minor and advisory roles.
In April 1971, Seoul informed Washington of their plans to reduce troops strength by one
combat division beginning in October 1971. In a memo from John Holdridge of the NSC to
Kissinger, he suggests, “we would probably not wish the ROKs to begin their withdrawals until a
decent period of time after the GVN elections.”139 Holdridge followed up three days later with a
report on his trip to South Korea in early March where he reported telling relevant U.S. Embassy
staff that “there was no compelling interest in the White House in getting the ROK troops out of
Vietnam.” The Ambassador’s take was that Park “felt for political reasons he had to follow the
example of other TCCs [third country combatants] carrying out withdrawals from Vietnam, but
would probably stop with the removal of the ROK marine brigade” as any further reductions
would “mean that the provisions of the Brown Letter on U.S. payment of MAP transfer costs
would no longer apply.”140 Therefore, Washington seems to have been alright with allowing Park
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to remove one marine brigade, but would not approve of any further reductions. Washington also
assumed Park would not attempt further reductions due to the monetary benefits.
News of ROK troop reductions in Vietnam were no secret to the public. In July 1971, US
News and World Report disclosed, “discussions are now going on between South Korea and the
Saigon Government that are expected to lead to the withdrawal of one Korean division before
June 1972.”141 U.S. Embassy Seoul told Washington in August 1971 that the Government of
South Korea had told them that “firm plans have been completed for withdrawal 10,000 troops
consisting of a marine brigade and “some supporting forces.” The South Korean government
source cited pressure “from several quarters” to withdraw more quickly from Vietnam.142
As these ROK plans came to light, the United States government needed to decide how to
respond and how much they would press for ROK troops to stay in Vietnam. In June 1971,
Kissinger forwarded the president the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State’s
recommendations for continued ROK troop support in Vietnam.143 The views of the Secretary of
State and Secretary of Defense did not complement each other. While Secretary of State Rogers
recommended the continued presence of two ROK division through 1972, Secretary of Defense
Laird instead believed all ROK forces should be withdrawn in 1971 in order to allow the funds
used to support them to go somewhere else more useful.144 According to Kissinger, South
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Vietnam had asked the ROK to keep their troops in country through 1972.145 It is unclear how
much the South Vietnamese request to keep Korean troops in Vietnam was their own or the
result of U.S. pressure. However, it seems that it was sincere due to the realization that
Vietnamization was not truly working and the South Vietnamese were not ready to fight the war
on their own.
In the end, Kissinger recommended to the President that the ROK troops stay through
1972, which is the option the President ultimately selected and ordered his Cabinet members to
carry out.146 The White House put forward National Security Decision Memorandum 113
(NSDM 113) on June 23, 1971 directing the U.S. government to “support the continued presence
of two ROK divisions in South Vietnam through CY1972.” The White House noted however
that the ROKFV would not receive any additional funding and “negotiations [between the
Vietnamese and Koreans] should stress the requirement of improved ROK performance in the
combat role in South Vietnam.”147 NSDM 113 would be the key document used to impose the
U.S. will on the Republic of Korea and induce them to stay longer in Vietnam than they would
have preferred.
Receiving this news, however, did not please Secretary Laird who basically thought the
ROK troops were a waste of money. It did not take Secretary of Defense Laird long to dissent,
writing three days later that, “General Abrams reported to me last January in blunt and emphatic
terms that the ROKs ‘were not pulling their weight…The benefits derived from the ROK’s
presence in RVN may be positive, but are almost assuredly small.” Laird added that the
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approximately $250-300 million spent on ROK troops “diverted to the RVNAF would in
Abrams’ judgment represent a bigger something.” Laird insisted the money be spent elsewhere.
Yet, Laird’s dissent did not sway Kissinger nor Nixon, and Kissinger took the
opportunity to discredit Laird’s view as “faulty,” positing himself as Nixon’s most trusted
advisor. Kissinger passed on Laird’s views to the President but dismissed Laird as building his
argument on a mistaken premise, that North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF)
would continue a policy of protracted war.148 Kissinger additionally quoted a recent cable from
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker saying that Thieu believed it was “important that the Korean
troops remain until 1972. He feels quite strongly that the Vietnamese will not have the capability
nor the manpower to fill the gap left by the departure of the Koreans earlier.”149 Thieu it seems
was hoping to slow down the process of Vietnamization.
In the end Kissinger recommended a comprise to continue to keep ROK troops through
1972 but to comply with Laird’s suggestion that information be gathered on how funds could be
used if freed up by an ROK troop departure (a token gesture, it seems.)150 As usual, President
Nixon was to follow Kissinger’s recommendation over that of his Cabinet.151 Nixon in reply to
Laird said simply “my decision reported in NSDM 113 that the U.S. will support the continued
presence of two ROK divisions through CY 1972 is reaffirmed,” largely ignoring Laird’s
concerns. He did however end by throwing Laird a bone, saying that the ROK redeployments
could be considered after the 1971-72 dry season “and I would welcome your suggestions and
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those from MACV on how additional resources might be used to improve the security situation
in South Vietnam.”152
Yet, the White House continued to worry that the ROK would redeploy its troops from
Vietnam sooner than hoped for. In September 1971, NSC staff reviewing the ROK forces
situation in Vietnam warned that “if events are allowed to take their own course, there is a good
chance the ROKs [South Korean government] will announce further redeployments [beyond the
one marine brigade] in CY 1972 after President Nixon announces our redeployment plans for
1972.” They added that “several signals point to future ROK withdrawals in CY 1972 that may
not be consistent with NSDM 113.”153 The staff offered two choices to Kissinger: either let the
ROK and South Vietnam work it out between themselves or inform the two governments “of the
terms of NSDM 113, i.e. we want two divisions to stay through CY 1972 and we are willing to
continue our support at past levels accordingly.”154 How much would the United States intervene
to keep ROK troops in Vietnam? A lot, it seems.
Kissinger, replying on behalf of the president, told his rival, Secretary of State Rogers,
that the State Department needed to relay a message to South Vietnam and the ROK that it was
“the view of the United States government that two ROK divisions should remain in South
Vietnam through 1972.”155 This was done with the assumption that the two countries would feel

152

Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of Defense Laird, July 10, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XIX,
Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972: 99.
153
Memo, K. Wayne Smith and John Holdridge to Henry Kissinger, September 1, 1971, Box H224, NSC
Institutional Files, Nixon Library.
154
Memo, K. Wayne Smith and John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, September 1, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XIX,
Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972: 105.
155
Memo, Kissinger to Secretary of State, September 23, 1971, Box H224, NSC Institutional Files, Nixon Library.
According to historian Robert Brigham, “Throughout his time in the White House, he [Kissinger] did what he could
to undermine Rogers in the eyes of the president.” Brigham, Reckless, 9. Carolyn Eisenberg agrees, writing, “By
spring [1970], Kissinger’s rivalry with the Secretary of State was careening out of control. With Nixon’s blessing,
the National Security Advisor had taken over large areas of American foreign policy, keeping Rogers in the dark
about such crucial items as negotiations with North Vietnam and the Soviet Union.” Carolyn Eisenberg,
“Remembering Nixon’s War,” in A Companion to the Vietnam War, ed. Marilyn B. Young and Robert Buzzanco
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 266.

46

obliged to comply with the wishes of the United States. Officials at the highest levels of the
Defense and State Departments would be instructing their South Vietnamese and ROK allies on
the preferred outcome. Yet, U.S. government authorities may have underestimated Park’s desire
to get out of Vietnam.
While the U.S. government was deliberating how best to encourage the ROK to stay in
Vietnam, a key advisor to Park met with Deputy National Security Advisor Alexander Haig in
Washington explaining that “President Park is now disenchanted with his country’s involvement
in Vietnam.” The special advisor to President Park, Pyong-choon Hahm, added that the South
Koreans were unimpressed with the South Vietnamese will to fight. “South Korea had assumed
the South Vietnamese would fight the threat of a Communist take over as fiercely as they had in
the 1950s.” Additionally hinting at why the ROK was looking to leave Vietnam, he said that
“Korea became involved in large part to satisfy its obligation to the U.S. Now, however, South
Korea finds itself on the receiving end of much criticism from abroad – its troops’ behavior in
South Vietnam has given rise to an international image of Korea as bloodthirsty.156 Mr. Hahm
said that he himself had been advising President Park to get out of Vietnam.”157
Yet the United States did not want Korea to leave Vietnam and would insist it stay, and
try to shame them into staying by saying that to withdraw all troops now would be irresponsible.
Haig replied to Hahm that they must act responsibly in Vietnam and “leave Vietnam in a way
that South Vietnamese forces will be able to defend the country.” He told Hahm that “this means
that South Korea should plan on leaving its forces there for at least the coming year.” Haig
warned that “if South Korea precipitously pulls its forces out, thereby undercutting the Nixon
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Doctrine’s reliance on Asian nations’ defending themselves, this action would bring even greater
criticism on South Korea.” As Haig concluded, “we have all come too far and have invested too
much in Indochina to give up the ghost now.”158 While Haig threatened international criticism if
Korea were to leave Vietnam, the Koreans must also have sensed greater unsaid threats of
various economic and political losses in their relationship with the United States.
Yet Haig’s message to the ROK government does not seem to have percolated back to
the important players in Seoul, or perhaps it was just a message they did not want to hear. In a
U.S. Embassy cable in November 1971, Ambassador Bunker wrote that the Acting Minister of
Foreign Affairs said to him that while “I [the Ambassador] was undoubtedly aware that GVN
had requested two division forces to remain in Viet-Nam through 1972,” that was not the ROK
government plan. Despite the GVN request, the “ROK plans are to withdraw from Viet-Nam
remainder of ROK forces by end of 1972.”159 The Ambassador did his best to explain that this
went against the wishes of the U.S. and South Vietnamese government and “closed by repeating
the belief that retention of ROK forces in South Viet-Nam through ’72 was necessary.” While
the ROK denied publicizing the additional withdrawals from Vietnam, the Ambassador
mentioned that he had already seen newspaper articles with regard to this.160
Koreans continued to insist on their serious worries related to postponing the
redeployment from Vietnam. The acting Foreign Minister Yuk Sok-hon described Korean key
concerns in two main areas: the PRC joining the United Nations and potentially using the ROK
presence in Vietnam against them and security on the Korean peninsula. While the United States
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continued to argue that it was not disengaging from South Korea and Asia, the ROK government
admitted this was their worry, and especially if this included reductions in U.S. Forces Korea,
that this would embolden North Korea.161
In December 1971, South Korea began its planned Vietnam deployment of approximately
11,000 ROK troops including a Marine brigade. This was still at the level that Washington had
indicated would be acceptable, but the United States was adamant about preventing further ROK
deployments. As these redeployments began, Washington sent guidance to Seoul that this
deployment should be the last for a while. “In January 1972, the U.S. Ambassador at Seoul
informed President Park that the U.S. desired the two ROK divisions to remain in Vietnam
through CY1972.”162 Yet, Park was not one to quietly take directions from the United States.
Despite the wishes of the United States, the South Koreans continued tough negotiations
regarding their troops in Vietnam. In February 1972, the ROK presented the United States with
an ultimatum that if it did not receive full assurances of support for Korean troop security in
Vietnam, they would begin withdrawing their two remaining divisions starting in June 1972.163
Reacting to this news, Kissinger tasked the NSC Under Secretaries to prepare a report. (The
Under Secretaries Committee, established in January 1969 when the National Security Council
was reorganized by the Nixon Administration, played a key role in creating and implementing
National Security Study Memorandums.164) The report would be on trilateral “ROK/GVN/U.S.
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negotiations concerning the continued presence of ROK forces in South Vietnam.” It was clear
Kissinger assumed the United States should play a key role in these negotiations. The United
States also sought to keep any other matters from putting President Park in a bad mood.
Kissinger warned that “in the interim the President has directed that no steps should be taken visà-vis the ROK which could adversely affect its willingness to retain two full divisions in South
Vietnam through at least CY 1972.”165
At the same time, U.S. government staff was evaluating the effectiveness of ROK troops
in Vietnam. An NSC study seemed to support Laird’s view that, at least as of late, the ROK
performance in Vietnam was less than exemplary. An assessment by the NSC Under Secretaries
committee in March 1972 found that “during the first few years in Viet-Nam ROK performance
was generally good. For the past several years, however, offensive combat operations declined
and they have relied heavily on static defense within their assigned areas of operations. During
their deployment in Viet-Nam, ROK forces have taken more than 11,000 casualties of which
about 4,000 were killed in action.”166
Behind the scenes, the Koreans continued to threaten to leave Vietnam. As of March 21,
the NSC Under Secretaries committee wrote, “Publicly, the ROKG has served its position,
stating that the question of ROK forces in Viet-Nam will be decided in consultation with the
United States and GVN. Privately, the ROKG has told us that they are going ahead with plans
for redeploying their two divisions to Korea beginning June 1, 1972.”167 The Koreans were out
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to play hardball in their negotiations with the United States, perhaps to see how badly the United
States wanted this outcome.
The U.S. government sought to understand the ROKs position and why they were
fighting in Vietnam. The NSC committee found the ROK saw Vietnam as payback for aid in the
Korean War, a way to deflect communist ambitions from Korea, and as highly profitable.
Additionally, “the ROKG also views its assistance to the U.S. and Viet-Nam as placing some
obligation on the United States to maintain a U.S. military presence in the Korea and as adding
to the general reservoir of good will which exists in U.S. public and government circles toward
Korea.”168 Therefore, South Korea hoped its deployment in Vietnam would earn it credit, both
monetary and in favoritism, from the United States. The U.S. government analysis, however,
seems outdated. By this point the ROK government seems to have believed that it had exhausted
the benefits of sending troops to Vietnam and now hoped to bring them back in order to assuage
domestic political opposition and to bolster security against North Korean threats.
In analyzing why the ROK wanted to withdraw from Vietnam, U.S. government leaders
understood that the ROK was very worried about a growing international image as
“mercenaries” and a worry that continued deployment could negatively affect its relationship
with the PRC. This at a time when other nations such as the U.S. and Japan were engaging with
the PRC, thus gaining a more favorable position with the PRC who would now have power at the
United Nations. Finally, according to an NSC report, “the ROKG is genuinely concerned about
the security of its forces in Viet-Nam. It does not have confidence in Vietnamese military forces
and has made clear it looks to the United States and not the GVN for support. It does not want to
be in the position of taking the brunt of a North Viet-Nam attack once U.S. combat forces have
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been reduced to minimum levels.”169 Unfortunately, it seems the ROK troops also did not have a
very positive view of South Vietnamese forces.
By March 1972, the time of the committee’s report, only two brigades of U.S. troops
remained in Vietnam, leading to a larger role for the South Vietnamese and South Korean
military.170 It was around this time that the North Vietnamese leader Le Duan decided to attempt
a large-scale operation, this time with his conventional troops invading the South, in order to
weaken South Vietnamese morale and disturb President Nixon’s reelection campaign.171 This
became known as North Vietnam’s “Spring (or Easter) Offensive.” According to historian Dale
Andrade, the Vietnamese military in 1972 had many of the same problems it had had for the past
decade. Andrade writes, “the Easter Offensive showed that this partnership [between the United
States and South Vietnamese military] could work, but only as long as American firepower
remained abundantly available.”172 Many ARVN soldiers suffered from low morale at this point
in the war as they saw their U.S. allies leaving the battlefield.173
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The NSC committee listed its arguments on why the United States should press South
Korea to halt its plans for redeployment. “At the present time, however, the ROK presence in
four strategic provinces of Central Viet-Nam is important to GVN capabilities to defend its
territory and population. For this reason and because the ROKG has gone so far in its plans for
withdrawal of ROK forces, we cannot risk waiting for a further assessment of GVN progress but
must continue negotiations for retention of ROK forces.”174 At this point, U.S. troops were not
seen as an option to take over these duties. The committee added,
“President Thieu attaches great importance to the retention of the ROK
forces…He might become more discouraged if, so soon after the U.S.-PRC
summit talks, we were to fail to make a serious effort to persuade the ROK to
maintain its troops in Viet-Nam at least through this year. Thieu has told
Ambassador Bunker that, if the ROK forces are withdrawn this year, he will ask
our support in forming two new ARVN divisions to take their place. This raises
questions beyond the scope of this paper such as the unusually high desertion
rates and low on-board strengths in the present ARVN combat units, and the
strain this additional requirement would place on GVN manpower and economic
resources.”175
A key issue was helicopter support for remaining ROK troops. “While it is possible that
the Vietnamese could provide limited helicopter support to ROKFV in an emergency,” the
committee wrote, “the provision of such support on a routine basis is not feasible. VNAF
requirements to provide helicopter support to RVNAF in all four Military Regions of the RVN,
Cambodia and Laos; the modest helicopter mobility capability of VNAF; and the programmed
reduction in U.S. helicopter support, already tax VNAF to the limit of its ability.”176 The South
Vietnamese air force, at the time made up of 44 squadrons and approximately 42,000 personnel,
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was just not ready to pick up the slack of departing U.S. troops that had been providing
helicopter support to the ROK troops.177
Meanwhile, the United States discussed how much American support it was willing to
provide to the remaining ROK troops. “As U.S. redeployments continue, retention of U.S.
personnel spaces for the support of ROKFV must be weighed against the impact on the security
of remaining U.S. forces, Vietnamization, the advisory effort, the air war, and support to
RVNAF. U.S. support for the ROKFV could become a sensitive issue in the United States if the
remaining U.S. military presence prevent an ROK troop withdrawal.” The committee suggests a
compromise plan of U.S. support however adds that when U.S. forces reach a 15,000 level no
U.S. support can be provided to ROK troops. Finally, in judging Park’s decision criteria, the
committee concluded, “If President Park is to be persuaded to retain two ROK divisions in VietNam through CY 1972, he must be able to point to specific benefits for the ROK because of the
concerns discussed earlier. His decision depends more on political considerations than it does on
the satisfaction of the ROK military support requests.”178
The final alternative, which the committee did not seriously consider, was to offer no
objection to ROKs planned withdrawals. Those such as Laird saw benefits of allowing the ROK
troops to withdraw as “this would allow the establishment of a balanced U.S. force structure
which could concentrate exclusively on the success of Vietnamization rather than dedicating a
substantial number of U.S. personnel spaces to support of a force which is marginally
effective.”179 However, the option was not considered because “the disadvantages are the
177
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psychological impact of withdrawal on the GVN and the inability to reverse the process if the
developing military situation would make a ROK troop presence necessary. There is also the
strong likelihood that President Thieu would press us for support in the creation of the two
ARVN divisions he has already said would be necessary to replace the ROK forces. This
support, if provided, would be an added charge to Vietnamization.”180 The fact was that
Vietnamization was already a strained process and the South Vietnamese military were not ready
to take on any added burdens. At this point, the United States was also not willing to pick up the
slack.
Little by little, the South Korean leadership seems to have eased up on its negotiating
strategy. As one example, they lowered their requirements for U.S. troop support. According to a
March 27 memorandum from Secretary Laird to the President, “The ROK Minister of National
Defense told Michaelis [Commander of U.S. Forces Korea] that he would no longer insist upon
the retention of two U.S. infantry brigades while ROK forces remained in Viet-Nam, and that the
presence of some U.S. ground combat forces would suffice.” Still, two assault helicopter
companies, and the availability of one assault support helicopter company, would be needed.181
Laird added that with this compromise, the United States would be able to continue to provide
support for ROK troops until U.S. troops levels went below 30,000.182
Finally, Laird told Nixon that Park had shared concerns with him that he “could face
severe criticism from his own public if he were to agree to keep ROK troops in Viet-Nam after
all other third country troops have departed.”183 The Koreans did not want to be the only ones
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left holding the ball. Some of the political fallout for Park’s continued deployment of ROK
troops to Vietnam found its way into the press. According to the Washington Post, “South
Korea’s Opposition New Democratic Party demanded today an early withdrawal of Korean
forces from Vietnam to improve Korea’s own defense posture against North Korea.”184
In the end, the United States decided to offer South Korea what it needed to keep its
troops in Vietnam. The President decided in April that “in order to facilitate the retention of the
two Korean divisions in South Vietnam through the end of CY-1972” the United States would
make assurances to support their troops such as providing air support, logistics support,
construction materials, and to prepare contingency plans to evacuate ROK troops in the case of a
contingency.185 What the ROK did not know is that they would be asked to do some of their
heaviest fighting in the last few months of the war.
With few U.S. troops left, and Vietnamization still a work in progress, Korean troops
would face some of their bloodiest battles of the war. In April 1972, Korea would also face its
largest battle thus far in Vietnam with Hill 638, and the An Khe Pass near highway 19. The
highway was an important road linking supplies between Qui Nhon and the Pleiku-Kontum area.
North Vietnamese had set up bases in a nearby hill and had been ambushing the highway. By
mid-April the North Vietnamese had blown up a bridge and succeeded in blocking highway 19.
This was followed on March 30, 1972, by a North Vietnamese attack on ARVN (South
Vietnamese) troops. Finally ROK troops retook Hill 638 and were able to reopen the An Khe
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Pass on April 26. Official accounts list the number of ROK casualties as 75 killed and 222
wounded, however the actual numbers are likely higher.186
As the “Easter Offensive” continued in spring of 1972, President Nixon appealed to
President Park that “at this moment of great trial for the South Vietnamese people, our two
countries have a special responsibility in providing whatever assistance we can in our common
efforts to defeat North Vietnam’s aggression.”187 Nixon praised ROK troops for their brave
fighting in the An Khe pass, yet he added politely that it had occurred to him and his advisors
that “in this critical and perhaps decisive phase, if your two divisions were to expand their
current area of operations it would provide a significant additional contribution.”188 In other
words, we need you to do more. Was this an additional “Koreanization” of the Vietnam War in
order to support the “Vietnamization?” By this time, the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam, now
mostly advisors to the ARVN, was down to approximately 70,000.189
Domestically, political pressures mounted and the Park government continued to insist it
was working on getting out of Vietnam. In July, South Korea’s Ministry of Defense was still
telling the National Assembly that South Korea was trying to withdraw all its troops from
Vietnam “as soon as possible.”190 They also publicly voiced frustration with the United States
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regarding Vietnamization. In August, the L.A. Times reported that, “South Korean Prime
Minister Kim Chong Pil indicated today that the South Korean government was irritated by lack
of information from the United States concerning negotiations in Vietnam, where 40,000 Korean
troops are serving.” “A one-sided withdrawal of U.S. forces would only hinder what we are
trying to do in negotiating with North Korea” said the Prime Minister.191 The ROK did not feel
like the United States was involving it sufficiently in the Vietnamization process, despite
Nixon’s recent requests for more aggressive combat from ROK troops.
During this time, as we shall see in the next chapter, another key bilateral issue between
the United States and South Korea was gaining more and more attention—the issue of the
reduction of U.S. Forces Korea. As much as the U.S. government tried to keep the issues of ROK
troop withdrawals from Vietnam and U.S. troop reductions in Korea separate, the press
continued to link them. The Washington Post in September claimed there had been a deal made
whereby the South Koreans would postpone the withdrawal of their troops from Vietnam in
exchange for a U.S. promise to keep troops in South Korea until at least 1973. The White House
and State Department publicly denied this.192 Yet, there was no denying that some of South
Korea’s most elite troops were kept fighting in Vietnam, instead of defending Korea. President
Park saw a clear link between a possible withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea and Korea
needing to get its troops back from Vietnam to take their place.193
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By the fall of 1972, there were more Korean troops in South Vietnam than American
troops. According to the Associated Press, there were 38,000 ROK troops and only 35,900
American troops.194 The war was continuously being “de-Americanized,” as the process of
Vietnamization had first been known. ROKs also greatly outnumbered all of the other “free
world” forces in Vietnam besides the United States. Blackburn writes that there were 36,790
ROK troops in Vietnam, along with 40 Thais, 130 Australians, 50 Filipinos, and 50 New
Zealanders in Vietnam in December 1972.195 The results of Vietnamization on ROK troops were
also often tragic. Benjamin Engel cites figures that while in 1968, 14,561 Americans and 663
Koreans died in Vietnam, by 1972 there were more Korean casualties than American with 132
U.S. dead and 380 Korean dead. Engel argues that these casualties were a “direct result of the
manner in which the withdrawal process took place.”196
Yet soon after, Park decided that it was time to take matters into his own hands and in
late 1972 Defense Minister Yu Chae Hung informed U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib that
regardless of the outcome of the ongoing peace negotiations in Paris, South Korea was
determined to withdraw all its troops from Vietnam by June 30, 1973197 Luckily, peace was right
around the corner, at least for foreigners fighting on Vietnamese soil. On January 27, 1973, the
United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the NLF’s Provisional Revolutionary
Government finally reached an agreement and signed the Paris Peace Accords ending the
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Vietnam War.198 The settlement called for a cease fire—which never came—with the United
States promising to withdraw all its troops and military advisors within 60 days. By January 31,
1973, South Korea was beginning its pullout from Vietnam and “hailing” its returning
soldiers.199 The formal end of operations for the South Korean expeditionary force to Vietnam
was March 15, 1973.200 The last U.S. troops left Vietnam a couple weeks later on March 29,
1973.
Parallel to Vietnamization, a key component of Nixon’s strategy to ending the Vietnam
War was peace negotiations. Looking at the Paris negotiations, the process that allowed for the
agreement to be signed mostly left the ROK out. As early as April 1966, the ROK had called for
its voice to be heard in peace talks regarding the ongoing war. The New York Times reported,
“Seoul, Citing Troop Aid, Seeks Voice at Vietnam Peace Parley”201 The ROK would continue
unsuccessfully to seek a voice, while often the views of the South Vietnamese, the country in
which the war was being fought, were not fully considered.202 Nor, in many cases, were they
kept fully informed. According to historian David Anderson, while Kissinger worked to maintain
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Thieu as leader of South Vietnam, “he treated Thieu with disdain and kept the Saigon
government totally out of the details of the process.”203
For example, in May 1969, Nixon announced conditions for a potential peace treaty to
allow the NLF a political role in South Vietnam’s government and simultaneous U.S. and North
Vietnamese withdrawals. These terms came as quite a shock to the South Vietnamese, as the
South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington said it was all news to his government.204
Anderson argues that throughout the peace negotiations with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger failed to
keep Thieu informed or listen to Thieu’s concerns. Even worse, in October 1972 when Thieu
objected to a draft peace agreement that allowed North Vietnamese army units to remain in the
South, Kissinger ordered his messenger Haig to tell Thieu that if he didn’t go along with the
agreement, the United States would unilaterally disengage from South Vietnam.205 If this was the
way the United States treated South Vietnam, the country for which it was supposedly fighting to
“save,” one can imagine the disregard it gave to its ROK allies regarding peace negotiations. In
the end, Thieu would be left with a much weaker and untenable situation than the Koreans at the
end of the Korean War.206 This would help lead to the fall of South Vietnam and the Saigon
government in 1975, with Thieu living the rest of his life in exile.
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Looking back at Korea’s time in Vietnam, there are many positive as well as extremely
critical assessments of Korea’s actions. In general, their tactical military skills seem to have been
more highly regarded than the much-maligned South Vietnamese military. According to a 1975
U.S. Army report, ROK troops were thorough in planning, their officers spoke excellent English,
and their soldiers had become much more independent and self-confident than in the Korean
War.207 Additionally, the troops were disciplined and had an “immaculate appearance.”208 As
noted earlier, however, the ROK troops had many American critics. Westmoreland and Laird, for
example, felt the Koreans were taking it “too easy” and not pulling their weight.
The ROK troops appear to have excelled at pacification projects and localized defense.
This may have been due to their logistical needs to stay in a certain area, which would allow
them to build stronger ties with the locals. According to the U.S. army report, “Korean combat
forces had their greatest success with small unit civic action projects and security operations
within their Korean tactical area of responsibility. Complete success eluded the Koreans,
however, because of their insufficient co-ordination and co-operation, and the initial impression
they made in dealing with the Vietnamese.”209 And finally, by one of the most misguided
standards of judging success in the Vietnam War, the Korean troops “enjoyed” a very high kill
ratio.210
Yet, this “very high kill ratio” hinted at a severe problem with ROK troops, the
allegations of atrocities.211 Knowledge of irregular acts seems to have come early. According to
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Frances FitzGerald, writing in 1972, “for at least two years, the generals of Westmoreland’s staff
refused to let even the analysts on contract to the Defense Department investigate the wholesale
slaughter of civilians by Korean troops in the course of their “pacification” program.”212 The
atrocities would also be the reason why Korea’s “forgotten war” would return to South Korean
public consciousness. In 1999, the left-leaning and independent Hankyoreh newspaper published
in its sister magazine a series of articles describing a Korean massacre of Vietnamese
civilians.213 This led to a wider discussion of the Vietnam War in Korea, and a backlash by ROK
Vietnam War veterans who sacked the offices of the Hankyoreh.214 It is an issue that continues to
be discussed by civil organizations, the media, and through lawsuits filed on behalf of the
Vietnamese.
Finally, Koreans were often seen as “in it for the money.” Officials in the United States
saw the ROK government was seen as milking negotiations on their troop deployments with the
United States for as many benefits it could get, while the soldiers themselves were seen as
corrupt, particularly in their exploitation of the U.S. military PX system. The large secret
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payments the United States had made to the Koreans for their participation in Vietnam came to
light during the Symington Hearings.215 The Congressional Symington Subcommittee hearings
were led by Senators William Symington (Democrat-Missouri) and J. William Fulbright
(Democrat-Arkansas) in 1970. They examined secret payments by the United States to its free
world allies in Vietnam. The outrage at the excessive payments to South Korea for its
Vietnamese service led Symington to question the need for U.S. troops in Korea. Thus, the
outcome was increased pressure in Congress to reduce the size of U.S. forces in South Korea.
South Koreans soldiers also became known for their overuse, and sometimes abuse, of
the PX system, the tax-free discount stores located on U.S. military bases. Soldiers often spent
their earnings on luxury items at the PX that they could send back to their families to resell.
Sometimes this also led to black market activity. In the novel, The Shadow of Arms, Vietnam
veteran and author Hwang Sok-yong describes extensive black market activity by not only
Koreans, but also Americans and Vietnamese.216 In the novel, the main character is a Korean
soldier tasked with investigating black marketeering. The U.S. government was aware of the
corruption, with investigations revealing that “substantial amounts of US funds and property
have been diverted from their intended purposes by the ROKFV [Korean Forces in Vietnam].”217
As a result, ROK troops were banned from PX stores in 1967 due to their extensive purchases.218
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While ROK troops may have taken “easier” assignments and avoided combat during their
early deployment to Vietnam, by the last year of the war they were engaging in combat with high
casualties in crucial battles needed to advance the cause of the South Vietnamese. The fact they
were still needed was added proof that Vietnamization had not been a successful strategy.
Coming from a poor country still recovering from its own civil war, it is not surprising that many
took advantage of the legitimate and illegitimate financial opportunities offered by service in
Vietnam. Atrocities are a troubling and difficult legacy of their service in Vietnam and need to
be examined more closely. Given the high level of anti-communist propaganda imposed on
South Koreans in their own country, it is not unlikely that they dehumanized the NLF enemy.
Their relationship with the locals was often more complicated as some saw a reflection of
themselves as young children non-combatants during the Korean War.219
With the end of the war, American prisoners of war (POWs) came home to a celebratory
reunion with their families. More English-research still needs to be done on Korean POWs of the
Vietnam War. While in 1973, the ROK commander in Vietnam assured the Korean public that
due their bravery, “there was not a single Korean POW,” it was not long before some ROK
POWs were found and returned and the ROK government had to backtrack on this statement.
According to the left leaning Hankyoreh newspaper, some missing Korean soldiers from the
Vietnam War were also later identified in North Korea.220 Many soldiers both in the United
States and Korea would also continue to deal with issues related to the war such as trauma and
health effects from exposure to Agent Orange. The United States lost 58,220 of its troops in
Vietnam, while South Korea lost 4,687 soldiers.221
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Leaders of both countries faced different crises, with Nixon losing his office and Park
becoming nearly all-powerful domestically. The Watergate scandal implicated Nixon and would
lead to his ultimate resignation in August 1974. Park Chung-hee would clamp down on civil
freedoms and lead his country through his most dictatorial period until his assassination in 1979.
Park would watch the fall of Saigon, once such a key U.S. ally, left on its own as the Republic of
South Vietnam ceased to be.222 The U.S.-South Korea Alliance along with the place of the two
countries in the world had also been forever changed by the Vietnam War.

222

According to U.S. officials, even after the fall of Saigon, Park remained “anxious to work with us because they
see no other option.” Memo, W.R. Smyser to Kissinger, July 15, 1975 in Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files:
Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004),

66

4

Changes in the Alliance: The United
States Loses Leverage
Under the Nixon administration, the United States relationship with the Republic of

Korea would significantly change, yet the bilateral security alliance would remain in place. Due
to the United States’ diplomatic overtures to the Soviet Union and the PRC, the “ideological”
anti-communist glue between the two countries would be questioned. This in turn, made
President Park extremely insecure about his country’s status and security. Park likely felt his
alliance with the United States had been “downgraded” as he received less economic aid in
general and less direct and indirect payments for South Korean troops in Vietnam. In this
chapter, I will show how issues in addition to the Vietnam War, though indirectly related, led to
a weakening of U.S.-ROK relations, especially the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from the
Korean peninsula. To Park, this was a unilateral move on the part of the United States who failed
to consult him properly – though it appears he did not make himself available. At the same time,
Park witnessed massive changes in the United States’ relationships with two other anticommunist allies, South Vietnam and Taiwan.
In fact, the way South Korea had been treated by the United States in regard to the
Vietnam War left many Koreans disillusioned. By May 1972, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea
Philip Habib reported, “Since my return to Seoul a few weeks ago I have detected a submerged
but real feeling of concern among Koreans that they are being neglected by the United States.
Most specifically, they exhibit a degree of unhappiness over events in Vietnam in which they see
themselves being swept along by currents concerning which they have no knowledge, and over
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which they have no control.”223 In the process, though, Korea became much less a “client” state
of the United States and Park forged ahead with stronger dictatorial powers for himself. The
Vietnam War and the Nixon Doctrine were key factors affecting this change.
For Park, the critical issue signaling the United States’ commitment to the Republic of
Korea and its security was the stationing of U.S. troops in Korea. Notably, this was something
that did not happen in South Vietnam and perhaps would have made the 1975 North Vietnamese
takeover of South Vietnam much more unlikely. Yet, scaling down of U.S. troops in Korea was
an idea that Nixon inherited from the Johnson administration and which, for most in senior
positions within the U.S. government, the time was ripe.224
Review of U.S. force levels in Korea began early on in the Nixon administration. At a
National Security Meeting in August 1969, Nixon and his key aides discussed the U.S. Forces
Korea (USFK) issue. White House assessments of ROK troop capabilities were positive, which
helped argue the case that the defense of South Korea could be “Koreanized.” The White House
group concurred that ROK troops were strong and had good morale. Wheeler added that the
ROK Army was “well trained” and moderately well-equipped and that they “can stop a NK
[North Korea] attack alone with our support;” however their Air Force was inferior and
vulnerable.225
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Financial considerations were also taken to account as the United States was realizing it
could not be all things to all allies. For Korea, this meant more self-sufficiency and less reliance
on U.S. financial support. Laird argued for moving towards “Koreanizing” the defense of South
Korea and to restart the MAP transfer program immediately. Secretary of State Rogers suggested
that the Korean troops in Vietnam replace U.S. forces in South Korea. To this Laird replied,
“ROK wants to send more forces in SVN. Pay is 10 times as high there.”226 Laird throughout his
tenure as defense secretary seems to have been seriously concerned by the amount of funds spent
by the United States government on ROK troops in Vietnam.
The discussion of force levels in Korea was ongoing and would be tied to the Nixon
Doctrine. At a meeting of the NSC in February 1970, chaired by Kissinger, the issue of the
reduction of USFK forces and the force posture needed to defend against a North Korean or
combined North Korean and Chinese attack were discussed. Beyond military readiness, a
representative from the U.S. Information Agency raised the issue of the symbolism of U.S.
Forces in Korea. “Mr. Kissinger agreed that it was inconceivable that the President would decide
to withdraw all U.S. forces from Korea.”227 The United States needed to be seen as steadfast and
committed to its “free world” ally.
Yet, within the government not all thought as highly of the Korean forces’ capability to
take on North Korea on its own. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) followed up soon after with an
assessment that “the JCS believe that withdrawal, now, of US forces would be untimely.” This
was based on the fact that “the JCS do not concur with the judgment in the Korea Study that 12-
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14 ROK divisions could hold an attack by North Korea.”228 While Asians needed to defend
themselves, there was a realization that North Korea remained a formidable threat to its southern
neighbor.
Nixon, however, would move forward with implementation of his doctrine. With
National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) 48 in March 1970, Nixon ordered the
withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from South Korea before the end of FY1971.229 In return, the
United States would provide the ROK with a $1 billion package of military assistance and
equipment over five years, with an additional $50 million of economic aid per year.230 As with
Vietnam, the United States would attempt to woo South Korea with financial benefits in order to
comply with its wishes.
Yet, Nixon needed to explain this sensitive decision to President Park. The American
commander-in-chief, writing to Park in a letter on May 26, 1970, put the troop reduction in the
context of the Nixon Doctrine. He wrote, the “number of American troops in the Republic has
not declined from the level which prevailed when the Republic was far less able to assume the
primary burdens for its defense.”231 In other words, times were changing and Korea was much
stronger than it used to be, so the time has come to take on increased defense responsibilities.
While he promised that the United States would maintain its treaty obligations, he also reiterated
an explanation of the Nixon Doctrine. “It is also my policy that as the strengths and capabilities
of our Allies increase it is reasonable to expect them to assume more of the responsibility for
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their own defense and specifically to provide the bulk of the manpower required for that
purpose.”232 The bottom line was South Korea was going to have to learn to defend itself.
Park, however, was not satisfied by this explanation and wrote Nixon that the partial
withdrawal of USFK troops during 1971 was “impossible” unless the United States met certain
conditions. These included the completion of ROK force modernization (at a cost of
approximately $2 billion) and promises that the United States would continue to have a military
presence on the peninsula and assist Korea in the case of a contingency.233 Park was not shy
about sharing his demands with the public if he thought it would help him in his negotiations
with the United States. A White House memo to the President also noted that President Park was
going public with the news hoping for an outcry.234
Park did not even want to discuss the topic with any U.S. officials, so the top Americans
in Seoul paid him a visit. In August 1970, U.S. Ambassador Porter and General John Michaelis,
the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, met with President Park to discuss the reduction of USFK
troops and try to overcome what appears to have been a lack of willingness on the part of Park to
discuss troop reductions at all until he had received certain assurances such as that “there will be
no outbreak of war in Korea” and promises of additional assistance for the modernization of the
Korean military. Ambassador Porter described the scene:
“I then said that we regretted that there is no change in their willingness to talk
with us and I would describe problems arising in connection with our discussion
to reduce number of our troops. Our planning, which we had unfortunately been
compelled to do alone because the ROKG felt it could not participate, provides
for reduction of 5,000 spaces by December 1970, of 8,500 more at the end of
March 1971, and of 4,900 by June 30, 1971. This apparently was not to Park’s
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liking. As translation proceeded, Park closed his eyes and jiggled his knee as he
does under stress, and ordered coffee.235
Park again placed conditions on his compliance with the troop reduction, replying that he
was not open to discussions until the talks on the modernization of Korean forces had concluded.
However, due to Congressional constraints on the budget from which ROK military
modernization would be funded, Porter told Park, “all this comes down to question of
confidence. We have given every possible assurance at our highest level about our intention to
modernize their forces, and we have reiterated out commitment to their security. Legally, it is
impossible for us to do more than we have done.”236 Compliance with Park’s conditions was
conditional on the agreement of the U.S. Congress, but Porter was telling Park to “just trust us.”
A few of the reasons why Park was so upset become clear later in the cable. Though
perhaps due to a misunderstanding, Park felt promises made to him had been broken. In his
telegram to Washington, Ambassador Porter wrote that Park recalled when President Nixon had
explained the Nixon Doctrine to him the year before, Nixon had “assured him [the] Doctrine
would not be applied to Korea” and instead indicated that the U.S. force presence in Korea
would be strengthened. Park added that he had also received assurances from U.S. officials that
as long as there were ROK troops in Vietnam, there would not be any cuts to U.S. Forces Korea.
Porter found Park’s understanding of the situation to be mistaken but refrained from
embarrassing him by correcting him in front of others.237
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Park, still upset, added, “that if U.S. troops were being moved elsewhere for emergency
purposes then this hasty withdrawal would be understandable but that is not case and it is based
only on U.S. domestic political problems and ROK should be given more time. So far everything
is on unilateral basis and U.S. is not respecting or listening to ROK wishes. U.S. troops are
merely going home and withdrawal is not for any emergency purpose. What about NATO? Why
aren’t troops being withdrawn from there?”238 In other words, Park was asking why are you
doing this to me now? And why are you not listening to my sincere concerns related to security
and the North Korean threat? Finally, was Korea and Asia as important to the United States as
Europe?
According to Laird biographer Richard Hunt, South Korea was so adamantly against the
United States troop departure, it tried using its Vietnam card, threatening to cut down or end their
military deployment in that Southeast Asian nation.239 In the end, it would not come to this.
South Korea did receive financial aid but not nearly as much as it had asked for. Of the
additional $2.5 billion of military aid requested by Park, South Korea received only a relatively
slight increase from the original offer of $500 million in aid.240
As with many decisions regarding the Vietnam War, the United made the USFK troop
reduction decision unilaterally and the ROK felt it was imposed on them. In a December 1970
meeting with Kissinger, Kim Chong Pil, a South Korean political heavyweight who would
become Park’s Prime Minister approximately six months later, revealed that the ROK viewed it
as a “sudden unilateral announcement concerning reductions” of U.S. forces in Korea. Kim said
the announcement had put the ROK government in an “embarrassing position” at a time when
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Park was looking to the next year’s election.241 Being seen as powerless in the face of the United
States had a domestic political cost for President Park.
At the same time, the United States continued to assess the capabilities of the South
Korean military. As a December 1970 intelligence review of Korean issues concluded, South
Korea’s “military strength poses a substantial deterrent to any North Korean invasion. And South
Korea’s international position is notably stronger than that of the North. The planned withdrawal
of one US Army division from South Korea will not of itself significantly alter this balance.”242
They believed “South Korea estimates of the impact of the proposed US troop withdrawals on
the actual military balance largely parallel our own.” South Korea was capable to withstand a
North Korean attack, they concluded.
Yet, South Korea still believed they should not have the Nixon Doctrine applied to them.
The real issue it seems was “that North Korea might miscalculate the withdrawals, as a sign of
diminished U.S. commitment, reflects their own fears that indeed this may be just the beginning
of a general disengagement policy.” In a reference to events immediately preceding the Korean
War, the analysts wrote, along with the giants in their neighborhood (the USSR, China and
Japan), “they worry about the Americans who, they feel, once before withdrew troops from
Korea too soon.” Perhaps because of this history, “South Koreans feel strongly that they are and
ought to be an exception to the Nixon Doctrine.”243 Finally, in an astute prediction of what was
to come, the report stated, “if President Park, who has staked everything on the US tie, feels
‘abandoned’ and exposed, it might aggravate his tendency to become more authoritarian in his
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rule and less accessible to the reasoned advice of subordinates in times of stress.”244 In March
1971, the United States went forward and withdrew the 7th Division of the U.S. Army from the
Korean peninsula.245
By the end of 1971, Park had announced an “emergency situation” allowing for greater
presidential control of the country. The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and
Research judged that while publicly, the threat of North Korea was cited, “Park’s move is related
much more directly to the internal situation.” They judged the factors that Park saw as leading to
instability to include his prospects for re-election and his desire to remain in power. Additionally,
U.S. troop withdrawals from South Korea, combined with a U.S. Congress more and more
inclined to cut funding, “have been the most unsettling aspect of the changing external situation.”
Another important factor related to the United States was the economy, with South Korea
receiving less favorable trade benefits with “restrictions on textile imports, and declining
Vietnam procurement.” Finally, Nixon’s détente and outreach to China made Park insecure as
the “clear distinctions between ‘communist’ and ‘free’ worlds threaten to weaken the ideological
glue that has long served as a partial substitute for cohesive social institutions.”246
With the USFK reductions (despite desperate pleas by the ROK government to the
contrary), the Park administration was greatly disappointed in the United States. Park felt
betrayed by the withdrawals, especially since he believed had had received promises from
President Nixon that this would not happen.247 In the 1970s, the United States was left with little
leverage to push for democratic reforms in Korea and President Park Chung-hee was able to
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suppress any domestic opposition.248 For the South Koreans, many learned not to trust the United
States to take ROK priorities into account when it made crucial foreign policy decisions. Similar
lessons were learned by other U.S. allies as well. During the prelude to Nixon’s historic visit to
Beijing, Kissinger had already secretly told the PRC that the United States planned to withdraw
troops from Taiwan once the Vietnam War was over and that the administration disagreed with
the “two Chinas” doctrine.249 In 1971, Taiwan lost its seat as a permanent member on the United
States Security Council and by the end of 1978, there would be no U.S. combat troops left on
Taiwan.250 The lesson would be that alliances were not that important if they didn’t support U.S.
aims fully and unconditionally, or if they conflicted with grand strategy.
In the end, Park would declare a “Yushin” constitution for his last seven years in power,
severely limiting civil rights.251 The military training gained in Vietnam would at times be turned
on its own citizens. According to Hang Hong-koo, “the same commanders, after their mission in
Vietnam, returned home and repeated their ritual in the Kwangju Uprising.”252 The United States
lost much of its ability to influence and curb ROK domestic human rights abuses.
In conclusion, South Korea’s economic growth due to the Vietnam War allowed the
country to move away from its strictly patron-client relationship with the United States.253
Unfortunately, South Korea’s growing independence, coupled with U.S. government neglect, led
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to a low point in United States- South Korea relations that coincided with a sharp rise in ROK
authoritarianism. In the 1970s, the United States was left with little leverage to push for
democratic reforms in Korea and President Park was left with a free hand to suppress
opposition.254
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Conclusion
The U.S.- South Korea alliance was profoundly affected by the Vietnam War. From
being a client state of the United States, the economic growth and leverage gained by the ROK
allowed the country to become a far more independent and strong country. At the same time,
misunderstandings and conflicts related to the war, as well as to the Nixon Doctrine, led to great
strains between the two countries, leading President Park to largely ignore U.S. advice
throughout the 1970s. During this period, Nixon viewed his anti-communist alliances as
secondary to improving ties with the great powers, specifically the USSR and the PRC. In
addition, domestic political concerns caused the Nixon administration to push hard for
reductions in USFK troops as well as in U.S. troops in Vietnam, leaving the ROK to take on a
much more difficult and dangerous role during the final year of the Vietnam War.
For the United States, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that any strategic advantages
probably were not worth the costs in inducing the ROK to participate in Vietnam. While there
were some military benefits, they likely did not outweigh the large financial cost, taken from
taxpayer funds in a secret manner. The question of whether it was worth it for the ROK to
participate in the Vietnam War is much more difficult. Korea’s economy grew by leaps and
bounds in the 1960s and early 1970s and the country would likely not be the twelfth largest
economy in the world today if it had not had the influx of funds due to the Vietnam War.255 Yet,
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we likely do not yet understand the full impact of the Vietnam War on South Korea as many of
the details have yet to be fully explored. For example, were casualty rates accurate? Do we know
the full story regarding Korean POWs? For the individual soldier, injuries, exposure to
chemicals, and the horror of participating in or witnessing atrocities likely have remained
extremely challenging. Without a full picture, it is hard to say for sure that participating in the
Vietnam War was “worth it” for South Korea.
While the economic benefits for Korea were enormous, President Park’s main reasons
for sending troops to Vietnam were related to security and politics, hoping to keep the United
States a close ally. While this may have been true under President Johnson, under President
Nixon, this held less sway. However, several experiences related to the Vietnam War led to a
souring of the U.S.-ROK relationship that lasted through the 1970s and have a legacy of a
continued ROK worry that the U.S. will make foreign policy decisions in the region, and even
on the Korean peninsula, without consulting ROK authorities. President Park felt this occurred
both with regards to decisions relating to Vietnam (especially peace negotiations and
Vietnamization) as well as the opening to China, a key patron of the ROK’s rival, North Korea.
After the Vietnam War ended, USFK troop levels would continue to be a key bilateral
issue, most famously when President Carter sought to remove all U.S. troops from Korea upon
entering office. Few U.S. officials agreed with Carter’s policy and by 1979, the plan had died.
Today there are approximately 23,000 U.S. soldiers stationed on the Korean peninsula. The
current Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General Robert Bruce Abrams, is the son of General
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Creighton Adams, who served as the commander of U.S. troops in Vietnam following
Westmoreland.
Any scholar, diplomat or other professional working on the U.S.-Korea relationship
would profit from having a background in Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War to
understand current U.S.-Korea relations. The two country’s shared experience in Southeast Asia
helps us today understand Korean priorities and interests as well as their perception of the
United States. Scholars and policymakers should study this history because it tells us something
important about the nature of the U.S.-Korea alliance. Unless our allies are consulted on matters
directly concerning them, we will continue to sour these relations. As historian Gregg Brazinsky
argues, Korean agency does matter and if our partners are treated badly and left out of relevant
decision-making processes, their actions are likely to head in directions that we do not like.256
There are still many important areas of research still to be explored as they relate to
Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War. These include further study of the U.S.-ROK
relationship after the Vietnam War and how South Korea has gone on to support the United
States in all its overseas wars since Vietnam. Another interesting study would be on the
economic relationship between Korea and Vietnam and how its foundations were built during the
Vietnam War. For Korean language scholars, I would look forward to seeing a study of the
Korean soldiers’ experiences and their views on the United States both during and post-war.
Also, how has the Vietnam War been taught in the Korean educational system at various levels?
Finally, it would be interesting to know if there are any ties between Korean service in Vietnam
and immigration to the United States.
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To this day, both the United States and Korea continue to balance their economic and
security relationship.257 In the fall of 2019, after strained talks on sharing military costs (mostly
to cover the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula), the two countries broke off
negotiations.258 Current government officials of both countries continue, as have those in the
past, to reconsider the costs and benefits of the bilateral alliance. According to Sue Mi Terry of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, South Koreans are again weighing the benefits
of the alliance and whether it is worth the costs.259 Yet, given the ongoing threat posed by North
Korea, added by the need to maintain a balance in the region due to a rising China, it seems that
both countries will likely continue to find a way to continue their close alliance. Both sides may
need to compromise on costs and what they are willing to offer the other partner. Unfortunately,
neither country will be able to have its cake and eat it too.
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